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This paper provides a comprehensive examination of the first decade of investor 
activism in Japan.  In the context of a remarkable transformation of the Japanese 
capital market, we document the rise of hedge fund and other investors with a 
total of 916 filings of block acquisitions by activists in the period from 1998 to 
2009.  We show that there is, on average, a (modest) positive stock price reaction 
to the announcement of an activist investment.  These effects, however, are 
concentrated in events involving hostile funds.  When we examine returns to 
activism in the long run we find that gains are not significant overall, except on 
positions in large target firms.  We find that target firms tend to increase their 
payouts relative to peer firms in response to activist campaigns but we fail to find 
evidence that activists force target firm managers to institute major operational 
improvements.  Finally we document the explosion in the adoption of "poison 
pills" by Japanese firms.  We find that firms targeted by activists were more likely 
to adopt defense mechanisms.  Since 2007 there has been a substantial reduction 
in activity by activist funds.  Our paper contributes to the literature on investor 
activism by illustrating the limits to the success of activist funds in a market 
setting where the takeover market is thin and cannot be used by the activist 
investor as an "exit" strategy. 
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1.  Introduction  
 
Capital markets in Japan have experienced a remarkable transformation in recent years. 
Japan in the second half of the twentieth century can be described as a bank-oriented 
system where firms did not rely on equity financing and shares were largely held by 
banks, insurance companies and corporations (Aoki and Patrick 1994, for example).  
After the collapse of the real estate and stock market bubble in 1990 and the following 
"lost decade" of economic slump, banks suffered severe capital shortages and sold much 
of their equity holdings (Hoshi and Kashyap 2004). Inter-corporate shareholdings also 
declined in the 1990s and 2000s. In contrast, foreign investors, most of which are 
institutional money managers, have become increasingly prominent.  Foreign ownership 
of stocks listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange increased from about 5% in 1990 to 24% 
by 2008.  In addition, local pension and mutual fund holdings have also increased.  
Figure 1 illustrates these recent changes in share ownership in Japan.1 
 
The rise of foreign (institutional) shareholders in Japan means a shift in the balance of 
power between corporate insiders and outside shareholders.  Investors have become more 
vocal and several activist funds have been at the forefront.  A common definition of an 
activist is a shareholder "who tries to change the status quo through 'voice,' without a 
change in control of the firm" (Gillan and Starks 1998).  Hedge fund activism has 
exploded in the U.S. in the last decade (see Brav, Jiang and Kim 2010 for a survey) and it 
has been especially controversial in Japan.  One high profile case that has drawn media 
attention is Steel Partners, a U.S.-based hedge fund whose main strategy is to take a large 
stake in a small company and persuade management to increase dividends and share 
repurchases (Greenwood, Khurana and Egawa 2009).2  Yoshiaki Murakami, a former 
government official, was also known as a leading activist shareholder in Japan.  Using 
various investment funds, he launched aggressive share purchases and a hostile takeover 
                                                 
1 Note that since the data source (Tokyo Stock Exchange) does not separate shares owned by trust banks on 
their own account from shares owned on behalf of investors in custodial accounts, the percentage for trust 
banks is overstated.  
2 In a few occasions, Steel Partners launched tender offers but generally these were aimed only at raising 
the share price and there were some accusations of "greenmail" - to push firms to repurchase their shares at 
a premium (Financial Times 2007).  
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bid, but following a high profile case where he acquired shares of Nippon Broadcasting 
System, admittedly based on tips from another corporate raider/activist Takafumi Horie 
of Livedoor, he was arrested and charged with insider trading.  Other activist investors 
have chosen a non-hostile approach.  Sparx, Asia's largest hedge fund, which received a 
large investment by CalPERS (California Public Employees' Retirement System) at its 
foundation (Financial Times 2002a; Jacoby 2007), has refrained from taking aggressive 
stances but has pressured firms to return cash to shareholders.  It is sometimes labeled as 
a "relational investor."  Another fund is Taiyo Pacific Partners that has worked 
cooperatively with companies to boost shareholder value.  Both Sparx and Taiyo have 
avoided the threat of a hostile takeover employed by "raiders" such as Murakami and 
Steel Partners.   
 
There has been little academic work examining how widespread has been investor 
activism and its effects in Japan.  In contrast, shareholder activism has been a subject of 
intense study in the United States.  Karpoff (2001) and Gillan and Starks (2007) describe 
the involvement of large institutional shareholders increased dramatically after the mid-
1980s with the advent of public pension fund activism but the effects have been mixed.3  
More recently, there has been a wave of hedge fund activism and studies have found 
positive abnormal returns around the time a hedge fund announces its activist intentions 
(Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas 2008; Clifford 2008; Klein and Zur 2008; Greenwood 
and Schor 2009, Brav, Jiang and Kim 2010). Gillan and Starks (2007) argue that research 
in this area is still somewhat nascent and the long-term effects are still unknown.  
Evidence on activism by large institutional investors outside the U.S. is scarcer.  
Recently, Becht, Franks, Mayer, and Rossi (2009) study the activist investments of the 
U.K. pension fund Hermes, while Becht, Franks, and Grant (2009) perform a broader 
study of investor activism in Europe.  For Asia, Kim, Kim, and Kwon 2009) examine 
institutional block-shareholders in Korea.  For Japan, Uchida and Xu (2008) perform a 
case study analysis limited only to Murakami and Steel Partners.  Ono (2008) describes 
                                                 
3 Theoretically, large shareholders can act as external monitors and reduce the free-rider problem (Shleifer 
and Vishny 1986). 
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the activities of more funds, but it is limited to the analysis of abnormal returns around 
announcement dates. 
 
In this paper, we study both short-term and long-term returns to investor activism in 
Japan by hedge funds and other institutional investors.  On the one hand, the potential to 
unlock shareholder value is higher in Japan, as many firms have high cash balances and 
weak growth prospects and activists can push for higher payouts.4  On the other hand, 
because of its relationship-based corporate culture, the barriers to shareholder activism 
are higher in Japan than in Anglo-American markets.  Also, it is not clear what exit 
strategy is available to activist investors.  Japan has been characterized traditionally by a 
very thin market for corporate control, but data collected by Recof, a mergers and 
acquisition consulting company, shows that the number of M&A activities has more than 
doubled in Japan in the 2000s to about 3,000 deals in 2007 (Recof 2009).  This change 
may be crucial for the success of hedge fund activism.  In fact, Greenwood and Schor 
(2009) document that most of the returns of activism in the U.S. are driven by the ability 
of hedge fund activists to force targets into a takeover.  Their study also finds that activist 
investors perform poorly when the activity in the market for takeovers declines.  
 
We construct a comprehensive dataset of fund activist engagements in Japan between 
1998 and 2009.  We hand-collect data from the mandatory filing on block-shareholdings 
that exceed the 5% threshold.  This requirement is similar to the schedule 13-D 
requirement in the U.S. (used in Brav et al. 2008; Klein and Zur 2008, Clifford 2008; 
Greenwood and Schor 2009).  We identify 34 activist funds, of which 27 are foreign 
according to top management's nationality.  Activist block acquisitions peaked in 2006 
and 2007. And about half the investors have a hostile attitude, as determined by press 
reports and the indication in their filing on whether the investor may make "significant 
proposals."  Our sample comprises a total of 916 filings of block acquisitions by activists.  
This is a substantial level of activity with investments totaling ¥6.8 trillion when assessed 
                                                 
4 The Economist (2007) reports that Japanese firms hold 16% of GDP in cash and securities, while the 
equivalent figure is about 5% in the U.S.  
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at the cost of acquisition at the initial filing dates (about U.S.$65-75 billion depending on 
the exchange rate used).  
 
First, we provide a description of shareholder activist campaigns in Japan over the last 
decade.  The large majority of activist funds accumulate ownership stakes of 5% to 10% 
that fall short of majority control and are long-term engagements with an average 
duration of investment that exceeds 2 years.  We then ask the question of what firm 
attributes make a company more likely to be targeted by activist funds.  We find that 
activists act like "value investors" and target poorly performing firms, firms with low 
leverage and high cash balances.  This is consistent with press reports that activists target 
firms in an attempt to increase dividends and share buybacks.  Additionally, activist 
funds targeted a considerable number of firms listed outside of the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange which were less familiar and possibly neglected by other investors.  
Nonetheless, we find that activist funds, on average, tend to target more liquid stocks.  
We also find that firms held more by foreign shareholders were more likely to be targeted, 
which suggests that other foreign (non-activist) investors acted as facilitators. 
 
Second, we turn to the question of whether fund activism worked in Japan.  We first look 
at whether it affected share values in the short run.  We find that, on average, the market 
reacted favorably by a 1.8% positive abnormal return to the first filings by an activist 
investor of an acquisition of a stake exceeding 5% of shares.  This announcement effect is 
lower than average abnormal returns around activist block acquisition disclosure in the 
U.S. that range from 7% (Brav et al. 2008) to 3.6% (Greenwood and Schor 2009).  
However, announcement returns were +3.8% for firms targeted by "hostile" activists.  
This more favorable market response suggests that the market perceived some value 
improvements when the activists' approach was more aggressive.  
 
To assess whether there is actual value improvement from activist engagements, we 
examine buy-and-hold returns over the full duration of the activists' investments.  We 
find that, on average, the raw buy-and-hold returns of activists were negative.  But since 
many events occurred in a bear market period in the Japanese market during the global 
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financial crisis, the buy-and-hold abnormal returns (i.e., net of Nikkei Sogo 
Comprehensive Index5  buy-and-hold returns) are on average +4.57% for the activist 
funds, or +1.39% per year.  Interestingly, when we isolate the events initiated by "hostile" 
investors, we find that the buy-and-hold abnormal returns are higher at +13.48%.  We 
conduct a more formal long-term return analysis using calendar time portfolio returns 
(CTPR) by buying firms that were targeted by activist investors at the time of first 
investor filing and selling when investor reduces its stake.  We form an Equal-Weighted 
(EW) portfolio that is long an equal amount on all open positions by activist funds and a 
Value-Weighted (VW) portfolio with weights in proportion to the yen position by activist 
funds in each firm.  We compute the EW portfolio returns and find that activist positions 
generated excess returns in the first half of our sample, a period when the Japanese 
economy started to recover from the "lost decade" and the stock market was going up, but 
these gains were erased when the market dropped during the worldwide financial crisis of 
2007 and 2008.  One explanation would be that in the credit crisis period the takeover 
and LBO market dried up (which is consistent with the similar findings for the U.S. by 
Greenwood and Schor 2009) and activists' demands for firms to distribute cash holdings 
were also less well received by the market in the crisis context.  In our main tests, we find 
that the EW portfolio performance does not statistically outperform when adjusting for 3 
return factors (market, size and value) for the Japanese market.  However, the monthly 
alpha for the VW portfolio is statistically greater than zero at 1.0% per month (12.7% in 
annualized terms).  Interestingly the activist portfolios load positively on small cap and 
value factors, indicating their investment style.  Overall, the evidence from CTPR 
analysis suggests that activist investment gains were concentrated on larger caps, not 
extending to smaller target firms.   
 
Third, we explore if the activists' interventions had real effects or if their portfolios' 
(slight) over-performance reflects just good skills at identifying undervalued target firms.  
We conduct a detailed analysis of the "significant proposals" made by activists for a 
subset of 234 proposals where such information is available.  We perform news searches 
                                                 
5 Nikkei Sogo (Comprehensive) Index is a value-weighted stock price index with dividends reinvested, 
covering all listed firms (except for stocks listed on JASDAQ - Japan Associations for Securities Dealers 
Quote System).  It is the most comprehensive stock market index in Japan.  
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and analyze companies' financials and determine success for each proposal if the activist 
funds' stated goal was achieved.  We conclude that the most frequent activist demands are 
for dividend increases and share repurchases and that these are also areas were requests 
were more successful.  Less frequently, activists demanded major reorganizations and 
operational changes (including M&As or asset sales) but these were much less 
successful.  
 
For the complete sample of 786 targeted firms, we collect data on structural changes 
based on whether there were any subsequent corporate action filings for the stock of the 
targeted firms and find that only 269 firms were subject to any corporate change either as 
target or acquirer in M&A or restructuring (and only 35 were eventually delisted).  So, 
overall, about two thirds of the targeted firms never underwent a significant change that 
would require a filing with the securities regulator. 
 
Fourth, we look at the overall impact of shareholder activism by examining the ex post 
performance of targeted companies.  We find no evidence that activism events are 
associated with improvements in the main measures of operational performance (such as 
ROA or sales growth).  Our results show that their impact is limited to increases in 
payout ratios for target firms and not for matching firms, but do not find other significant 
changes in financial policies or corporate governance practices (namely no differential 
effect on the use of executive stock options plans and adoption of "committee-based" 
board of directors).  This supports the general perception that the main strategy of activist 
funds acting in Japan involves building a stake and being able to persuade firm managers 
to increase payouts but stops short of achieving substantive restructuring of target firms.  
 
Finally, one dimension in which investor activism seems to have had a major effect, 
however, is in the adoption by Japanese firms of "poison pill" takeover defense measures.  
The first case of poison pill adoption was in March 2005 and since then 604 firms have 
adopted a defense measure (or about one sixth of the number of all listed firms).  We find 
that firms targeted by activists were more likely to adopt a "poison pill" measure after 
being targeted.  The test case for whether exercising "poison pills" can be upheld by 
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courts was the targeting of Bulldog Sauce by Steel Partners, the activist hedge fund.  In 
May 2007, Steel Partners launched a tender offer and Bulldog's board of directors 
announced a plan to offer three rights per share to its existing shareholders which cannot 
be exercised by Steel Partners, and this was approved by a majority of the shareholders.6  
Steel Partners filed a motion for a preliminary injunction with the Tokyo District Court 
which was rejected, the activist fund appealed to the Tokyo High Court and then also to 
the Supreme Court but Steel Partners' appeals were denied. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, we provide an 
overview of recent institutional developments in the Japanese market and conditions for 
shareholder activism.  Section 3 describes the sample and the data, as well as examples of 
activist investors in Japan.  Section 4 examines which firms got targeted by activist 
investors.  Section 5 looks at share returns in the short and long run following filing of 
activist stakes.  Section 6 examines in detail activist proposals, what effect activism had 




2.  Institutional Background on Japan and Conditions for Shareholder Activism 
 
Franks, Mayer, and Miyajima (2009) detail the history of corporate ownership and 
financing in Japan.  In the second half of the 20th century, bank finance dominated 
external finance and most Japanese firms had cross-shareholdings with their main bank 
and other companies with interlocking business relationships (known as keirestu, 
Bergloff and Perotti 1994; Weinstein and Yafeh 1998, for example).  Corporate and bank 
shareholders supported the management of companies in which they owned shares. 
Hostile takeovers were virtually non-existent, and mergers and acquisitions were 
typically between agreeing parties, with the approval of friendly institutional 
shareholders.  However, after the collapse of the real estate and stock market bubble in 
                                                 
6 The rights had a clause that Bulldog Sauce will repurchase Steel Partners’ rights for ¼ of the tender offer 
price.  
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1990 and the following "lost decade" of economic slump, this situation started to change.  
Banks suffered severe capital shortage and sold much of their equity holdings to count 
realized capital gains in their capital and firms moved from bank financing to bonds, 
commercial paper and other non-bank financing (Hoshi and Kashyap 2004).   
Furthermore, in order to stabilize the banking system, a legislation that limits the amount 
of banks' shareholdings was passed in November 2001 (effective January 4, 2002).  
Under this law, banks were required to sell equities (valued at the acquisition cost) that 
exceed the amount of their Tier 1 capital.  The government also established the Banks' 
Shareholding Purchase Corporation to facilitate the sales.  Keiretsu ties were also 
weakened over time by the increasing competition and globalization of the Japanese 
economy and corporate cross-shareholders also declined in the 1990s and 2000s.  This is 
in sharp contrast with foreign investors' share ownership that became increasingly 
prominent (see Figure 1). 
 
At the same time, the government and stock exchanges encouraged new startup firms to 
list their stocks by introducing new sections in stock exchanges with looser listing 
standards.7  Firms listed on these exchanges are typically not connected to keiretsu and 
do not have large proportion of shares held by institutional investors.  The last decade 
also saw several legislative changes for corporate finance and control in Japan.  The 1997 
amendment of the Commercial code introduced executive and employee stock options.  
The 1999 amendment of the same law enabled stock deals (exchanges of shares instead 
of cash payment) for mergers and acquisitions.  The 2001 amendment lifted limitations to 
stock repurchases to make it possible for firms to repurchase shares and put them as 
treasury stocks upon approval of the shareholders' meetings (and after 2003, this would 
only require a resolution by the board of directors).  Additionally, the "committee 
system" was introduced in the 2003 amendment of the Companies Act, where 
independent directors have to be a majority in audit, compensation, and nomination 
                                                 
7 In 2000, Softbank and NASDAQ established NASDAQ Japan in Osaka Stock Exchange. After 
experiencing financial difficulties, NASDAQ pulled out, but the market for young firms remains in Osaka 
as Hercules.  Nagoya Stock Exchange started Centrex for small and emerging firms in 1999.  In the same 
year, Tokyo Stock Exchange established MOTHERS for young firms. Sapporo Stock Exchange's 
Ambitious followed suit.  There is also JASDAQ (over the counter) market for young, small firms. 
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committees of a corporation.  From 2008, legislation similar to Sarbanes-Oxley Law in 
the U.S. (called J-SOX Law) regarding internal controls of a firm came into effect.  
Appendix A provides a comparison of corporate governance systems in Japan versus the 
U.S. 
 
Put together, the changes in economic and legal environment made the time ripe for 
shareholder activism to be effective in Japan in the 2000s.  Appendix B provides a 
comparison of the U.S. and Japanese legal environment for shareholder activism.  It 
should be noted that in Japan it is possible for shareholders to propose changes to the 
company charter, whereas in the U.S. shareholders can only vote out board's proposals to 
changes to the charter.  Also, dividend payment is a matter that is voted at shareholders 
meetings in Japan, but not in the U.S.  Directors can be dismissed for any reason by the 
election of shareholders in Japan, whereas in the U.S., company charters can state that 
director dismissals are not permissible without proper reasons.  Thus, Japan has stronger 
shareholder rights than the U.S., if shareholders decide to use them.  Overall, in the U.S., 
board's monitoring power is relatively strong while shareholder rights are mitigated; but 
in Japan, the monitoring role of the boards is often not separated from the role of 
executing business and firms had (friendly) shareholders as potential monitors in the past.  
Activist funds may have become aware of the strong power that they could exercise in 
Japan. 
 
3.  Data 
3.1.  Sample of Activist Stakes 
 
We focus our analysis on activist block acquisition filings by activist fund managers.  
Our data collection comprises a three-step procedure: (i) to hand-collect block-
shareholding filings; (ii) to identify which investors constitute activist investors; and (iii) 
to collect additional information on the targeted firms. 
 
First, we collect data on block-shareholding filings which are mandatory when an 
investor exceeds an ownership threshold of 5% of a company's stock.  Our main data 
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source is the filings compiled in EDINET,8 a site maintained by the Financial Services 
Agency (FSA).  This is an electronic disclosure system that contains all disclosure filings 
by investors and publicly traded firms with the FSA for the last 5 years.  Filing data that 
are older than 5 years are primarily obtained from publicly accessible web-site Kabunushi 
Pro (Shareholder Pro)9 and Kangaeru Kabushiki Toshi (Analytical Stock Investment).10  
The accuracy and the integrity of the data are cross-examined using other web-sites.11  
We also use a subscriber-based on-line database provided by eol, Inc. which contains 
historical filings with the FSA and the Ministry of Finance.  Finally, we use large 
shareholder databases from Toyo Keizai Shinpo Sha and Nikkei, and articles searched 
with Nikkei Telecom 21 to determine the earliest data activist funds activities became 
known.  
 
Appendix C provides a detailed background on the disclosure rules of large block-
shareholding in Japan and a comparison with the U.S.  Similar to the 13-D mandatory 
filing requirement in the U.S., in Japan the 5% rule on block-shareholding (introduced in 
December 1990 to the Securities and Exchange Act and now Financial Instruments and 
Exchange Act of 2007) requires that individuals and institutions that cross a 5% threshold 
to report it within 5 business days after the transaction.  Thereafter, changes over 1% 
(increase or decrease) also have to be reported within 5 business days.  However, until 
January 2007, institutional investors were exempt from frequent reporting under the 
"Special Reporting Provision" (Article 27, No. 26) and were required to report only every 
3 months, except for those with the intention of "controlling the business activities" of the 
issuer.  Thus, before January 2007, the date of the report may be as much as three and a 
half month older than the actual transaction date.  This lax special rule was put in place 
since the obligation to report each time was considered to be burdensome for passive 
institutional investors that may cross the 5% threshold in the course of normal daily 
operations. 
 




11These are http://kabuhoyu.cc/, http://www.kabutool.net/tairyo.html, etc. 
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In the actual filings we collected, all activist funds took advantage of this special 
reporting provision and reported only every three months, stating their investment 
purpose as "pure investment" or "to maximize investment return" and never using the 
language that suggests "controlling the business activities."  However, the hostile nature 
of the now (in-)famous activities of Yoshiaki Murakami's funds before his arrest in June 
2006 lead to the amendment to the law to require more frequent disclosure.  The 
amendment became effective on January 1, 2007 and the reporting frequency was 
changed so that all passive institutional investors are now required to register more than 
two dates in a month as their reference dates, and report the holding that exceeds 5% (and 
changes over 1% thereafter) within 5 business days after the reference date.  In the same 
amendment, the definition of the investors who can use the special reporting provision 
was changed from those "(whose) purpose of holding is not for controlling the business 
activities" to those "(whose) purpose of holding is not for effecting material changes in or 
giving material effect to the business activities of the issuer of the said Share Certificates 
as specified by a Cabinet Order" (Article 27, No. 26).  Thus, activist investors who 
engage in the act of making important suggestions (defined in the cabinet order as 
"appointment and discharge of CEO, significant changes to the composition of directors, 
rearrangement of organization such as mergers and acquisition, and going private, 
significant changes in dividend policy, etc.") to the issuers do not qualify for the special 
reporting provision and must submit the report within 5 business days of the transaction.  
The same amendment makes it mandatory to submit the block-shareholding report on-
line via EDINET from April 1, 2007 so that the filings are immediately available to the 
public.  After January 1, 2007, many funds changed their purpose to "to make important 
proposals" in their new filings or in revised filings for their existing investment.  
Appendix C provides more details on this.  
 
Second, we need to identify which block-shareholding filers constitute activist funds and 
not other classes of investors (insiders, raiders, private equity, etc.).  For this, we rely on a 
large body of articles on newspapers, magazines, and websites written about investment 
funds.  We search them through Nikkei Telecom 21, Nexis/Lexis, and Google.  We 
exclude funds that specialize in private equity investment and workouts of distressed 
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firms.  Activist funds in our sample do not typically seek control of the target firm or to 
take it private.  We identify a total of 34 funds.  The list of these funds is provided in 
Table 1 – Panel A (described in full in Section 3.3).12  Most activist investors are value-
oriented institutional money managers.  A large number could be classified as hedge 
funds, some which specialize in Japan (Steel Partners, Sparx, and Sandringham) and on 
occasion some well-known international hedge funds that operate in the U.S. (Harbinger 
Capital and Perry) and Europe (TCIF – The Children's Investment Fund).  There are also 
more traditional value-oriented fund managers but with activist stances in Japan 
(Brandes, Arnhold and S. Bleichroeder, and Wellington).  Finally, there are also a few 
more entrepreneurial investors that could even be classified as "raiders" (Murakami) and 
its offspring (Effissimo). 
 
Finally, we gather price and accounting information for target firms.  We use Nikkei 
Portfolio Mater Database and Datastream for daily stock prices and volumes.  We also 
obtain various index returns for market benchmarks from Nikkei and Nomura Securities.  
Accounting data and information on board of directors are from Nikkei.  Data on filings 
of corporate restructuring are taken from Nikkei Financial Quest.  Data on takeover 
defense measures ("poison pills") are collected from various issues of the MAAR 
magazine, published by Recof Data.  
 
3.2.  Examples of Activist Investors in Japan 
 
To illustrate different activist styles in Japan, we provide a quick overview of the top 
activist funds operating in Japan.  In Appendix D, we review some of the firms targeted 
by these funds and display main financial information on these cases. 
 
                                                 
12 These 34 activist funds used a total of 47 investment vehicles.  Several funds used multiple vehicles.  For 
example, Murakami used four vehicles: M&A Consulting, MAC International, Ltd., MAC Asset 
Management, and MAC Asset Management Pte Ltd.  Although Murakami had these four filing vehicles, 
his funds were named differently, such as MAC JASF Investment Fund, MAC Small Cap Fund, MAC 
Buyout Fund, SNFE MAC Japan Active Shareholder Fund (HK), LP, MAC Leveraged Fund, and MAC 
Corporate Governance Fund.  We take the four vehicles to track all filings for these funds, but aggregate 
them into a single entity, "Murakami." 
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The first activist we examine is Yoshiaki Murakami, a former government official, who 
was perhaps known as the leading individual shareholder activist in Japan.  In 2000 his 
funds launched the first ever hostile takeover bid in post-war Japan against Shoei but did 
not succeed.  In 2001, he launched a campaign against Tokyo Style, a clothing company 
(see Appendix D).  At the time of the announcement, the value of the firm's cash and 
securities was more than its market capitalization, despite the firm having little debt (The 
Economist 2002). Acquiring initially 5.77% of its shares through his vehicle MAC 
International Ltd., he launched but lost a proxy fight.   However, he succeeded in getting 
the firm to increase its cash dividends and share buybacks (Financial Times 2002b).  In 
another high profile case, Murakami acquired shares of Nippon Broadcasting System.  In 
June 2006, Murakami was arrested and charged with insider trading related to Livedoor's 
acquisition of a large block of shares of Nippon Broadcasting.13 
 
The second example is Steel Partners, which is the best-known U.S.-based "hostile" 
hedge fund acting in Japan and whose main strategy consists of taking large stakes in 
small companies and persuading management to increase payouts (Greenwood, Khurana 
and Egawa 2009).14  It entered Japan in 2002 (through Steel Partners Japan Strategic 
Fund, a partnership with Liberty Square Asset Management, another activist hedge fund) 
and has so far targeted 41 companies.  Among its first investments was Yushiro Chemical 
where it filed a shareholding of 5.1% and subsequently pressured management to 
distribute the firm's large cash holdings.  Stock price responded positively.  Management 
was slow to respond and the fund launched a takeover bid (which failed) but eventually 
management agreed to increase its annual dividend.  In another well-publicized case, it 
launched a takeover of Myojo Foods and in response the company arranged for a buyout 
from Nissin Foods, which provided a good return for Steel Partners.  However, the fund 
did not succeed in all instances and was forced to reduce its stakes several times (one 
such case is Brother Industries in Appendix D).  With regard to another target firm, 
Bulldog Sauce, Steel Partners' activities led to a watershed ruling by the Supreme Court 
supporting the use of "poison pills."   Greenwood, Khurana, and Egawa (2009) provide a 
                                                 
13 The New York Times, "Murakami gets two years in jail in Livedoor scandal," July 19, 2007.   
14 Another case study of a U.S.-based hedge fund's activity in Japan is Foley and Greenwood (2009). 
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case study of Steel Partners' recent involvement in Aderans which resulted in Steel 
Partners having to nominate directors to the company's board.15  However, recent reports 
are that Steel Partners has been forced to cut investments selling mainly to return money 
to clients hurting from the 2007-08 financial crisis.16 
 
The third activist we review is Sparx, which is Asia's largest hedge fund manager, and 
which tends to takes a more subtle "non-hostile" approach.17  Its founding shareholders 
were CalPERS and Relational Investors (Financial Times 2002a). Jacoby (2007) 
describes how CalPERS, the prominent U.S. public pension fund, failed in its first 
attempts in the 1990s to employ the activist tactics it developed in the U.S.  
Subsequently, in the 2000s, it started to employ "relational investors" like Sparx.  Sparx 
has refrained from taking aggressive stances but still pressured firms to return cash to 
shareholders.  
 
Another "non-hostile" fund in Appendix D is Taiyo Pacific Partners which is based in the 
U.S., but that also tries to work cooperatively with Japanese companies to boost 
shareholder value.   Both Sparx and Taiyo have avoided the threat of hostile takeover 
employed by more "raider-like" funds such as Murakami and Steel Partners.   
 
 
3.3.  Summary Statistics 
 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on the sample of 916 activism events where an 
institution discloses a position of 5% or greater ownership in a firm.  The earliest event 
dates from 1998, and our analysis ends in July 2009. Close to three-fourths of the activist 
share stakes were formed between 2004 and 2007. A total of 759 unique firms were 
targeted, which means that some companies were targeted more than once.  This is a 
substantial level of activity with investments totaling ¥6.8 trillion when assessed at the 
                                                 
15 This matter is still in progress as of this writing and in the most recent shareholders meeting in May 
2009, Steel Partners’ proposal to replace the CEO was voted favorably by the majority of shareholders.   
16 Reuters, "Steel Partners cuts stakes in Japan firms by $1.7 billion," January 16, 2009. 
17 Business Week, "Patience Pays for Sparx Group," September 17, 2007. 
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cost of acquisition in the initial filing dates (about U.S.$65-75 billion depending on the 
exchange rate used). 
 
Panel A of Table 1 breaks down the number of events for each of the 34 activist 
investors.  The top activists in terms of number of filings are Sparx (245 filings, ¥605 
billion in initial investments), Atlantis (77, ¥39 billion) and Murakami (64, ¥376 billion). 
Investors are grouped first in terms of their top management's nationality: 7 of which are 
run Japanese nationals (of which 2 are registered outside of Japan). 18   Next, we classify 
investors on the perceived attitude towards management ("hostile" vs. "non-hostile") as 
reported in press articles.  This is a difficult task but 17 of these funds were reported to 
have a hostile attitude (such as Murakami, Steel Partners, Liberty Square, Brandes, etc.), 
while for the other 17 funds there was no public information of a hostile confrontation 
with management.  Using this criterion, there are a total of 356 hostile cases (39% of the 
sample).  As discussed in Section 3.1 above, after January 2007, investors are required to 
file if they may eventually make a "significant proposal."  So, as an alternative to relying 
on press reports at the time of filing, we use instead the post-2007 filing by each 
institutions to "fill back" for the earlier period. In the reports filed after 2007, 20 funds 
indicated that they may make important proposals. 19   These 20 activist funds are 
classified as "significant proponents" (including Sparx which we classify as "non-hostile" 
according to press reports).  Finally, Panel A also shows that activist block acquisitions 
peaked in 2006 and 2007.  Early entrants were Atlantis, Murakami, Silchester 
International and Sparx. 
 
Panel B of Table 1 provides summary statistics on the firms that were targeted.  We 
matched 858 events to non-financial firms covered by the Nikkei Financial Quest 
                                                 
18 These 2 funds include Murakami, who relocated his MAC Asset Management to Singapore in 2006,and a 
Effisimo, a fund set by some of Murakami’s offspring also registered in Singapore.  
19 We include Murakami as a "significant proposal" making fund, even though his funds ceased to exist 
before 2007, since it was well publicized that he was a vocal shareholder with many proposals to firms he 
targeted. Actually, the "significant proposal" legislation was enacted in response to Murakami’s activism 
activities in the prior period. 
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Industrial database.20  Less than half of the target firms are listed in the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange (TSE) First Section, which means many activists target firms in less visible 
stock markets.  The next most targeted market is JASDAQ.  Panel B also shows that 
target firms span all industries (with the exception of airlines).   
 
Panel C of Table 1 presents statistics on the capital committed by activist investors.  The 
average size of the activist stake at the time that the investor first files a position 
exceeding the 5% threshold is worth on average ¥7.8 billion (at cost) and represents 6.8% 
of the outstanding shares of the target companies.  Subsequent EDINET amendment 
filings reveal that investors increase their stakes reaching, on average, a maximum 
holding level of 9.9% in target companies.  So the activist funds in our sample 
accumulate ownership stakes that typically fall short of the level required for majority 
control of the target firms.  This is different from corporate raiders or private equity 
investors who aim to take the target company private. 
 
Panel C also provides a measure of the duration of activist investments.  As explained in 
Section 3.1, investors need to file the first time they pass the 5% threshold and thereafter 
every time they increase or decrease in their position is greater than 1%.  While it is 
impossible to determine the exact "exit date" where an investor's economic interest in the 
firm is eliminated, we can obtain the investor's last "large shareholding" filing.  If the last 
filing is over 6%, the position is assumed to be still open until June 31, 2009 (the end of 
our study) because the investor would need to file if his position had decreased by more 
than 1%.  In the case his last available filing is below 6%, we assume he has "exited" his 
large position in the firm (even if he still actually retains less than 6%).  The last two 
rows of Panel C show that activist engagements, on average, exceed 2 years (806 
calendar days).21  Using our definition of "exit date" underestimates the total duration of 
activist investments in the target companies.  In any case, activist fund investment 
                                                 
20  The remaining 60 firms that are omitted in matching with comparable firms are banks, insurance 
companies, securities houses, and other financial institutions.  These firms are added back in the analysis of 
returns. 
21 The minimum of 1 day in holding period is for cases where a fund reports the first 5% (but less than 6%), 
but no further reports are made.  It is possible that the fund held more than 1 day in these cases. 
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horizons have been a contentious issue and Panel C shows that investments are more 
long-term than usually thought.  
 
Figure 2 represents graphically all the activist engagements (grouped by investor) in our 
sample.  Again, one can see that many activist positions spanned multiple years.  This is 
not consistent with frequent criticism that these activist investors are short-term traders. 
 
 
4.  Which Firms Are Targeted by Activist Investors? 
 
We first turn to the question of what type of companies do activists target.  Table 2 
provides summary statistics of the target firms' characteristics in the year before they are 
targeted.  There are a total of 858 (non-financial) event firms for which we gather data 
from Nikkei.  To compare the target companies with their peers we use a matching 
procedure as in Brav et al. (2008).  For each target firm we get comparable firms that are 
from the same year, same Nikkei industry (see Table 1 – Panel B) and same 5 x 5 size 
(Assets) and market-to-book (Market value of equity/Book value of equity) sorted 
portfolios.  We form up to 5 matches for each target firm (if there are more than 5 
candidates then we selected 5 randomly).  Out of 858 event firms that had been matched 
to Nikkei, we could find comparables for 827 events.  In the 31 cases where this narrow 
criteria yields no match, we relax the criteria to match from the same year and industry 
but from 2 x 2 size and book-to-market sorted portfolios (i.e., above and below the 
median in each criteria).  We found comparable firms for 29 out of 31 event firms by this 
second matching procedure.  Thus we have final 3,619 comparable firms for 856 (out of 
858) event firms. 
 
Table 2 reports the t-test statistic for the difference in characteristics between the target 
firm and its peers.  Definitions for all variables are provided in the caption of Table 2.  As 
a result of the matching procedure, there are no statistical differences between size and 
market-to-book ratios of target and comparable firms (and also market capitalization and 
Tobin's Q ratios).  Target firms, however, are, on average, less levered, have higher cash 
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balances and slightly higher dividend yields.  The ownership structure of target firms is 
also tilted towards companies with higher foreign ownership (Pct Foreigners) and more 
management ownership (Pct Directors), but more insider ownership (less Pct Floating - 
outstanding shares that are floated in the stock market).  Also, target firms are more likely 
to have adopted takeover defenses ("poison pills") before the activist announces its stake. 
Finally, target firms have a higher stock liquidity (Stock Turnover). 
 
In Table 3, we present probit regressions of the probability of a firm being targeted by an 
activist investor. This answers the question of what firm attributes make a company more 
likely to be targeted.  We also provide the marginal effect of each explanatory variable.  
The table shows that target firms tend to lag behind comparable firms in terms of return 
on assets (ROA), which provides some indication that activists target poorly performing 
firms with some potential for improvement.  The negative and significant coefficient on 
Tobin Q implies that activist funds are "value" investors. Activists target firms that are at 
an average valuation discount.  The targets' capital structure also seems to matter as target 
firms are less levered (Leverage) which means activists may be looking at potential to 
add leverage because of unutilized debt capacity.  Also, we find that target firms have 
higher cash-to-assets ratio (Cash-to-Assets).  This is in accordance with some reports that 
most activists, whether "hostile" (such as Steel Partners) or not (Sparx), tend to target 
firms with large cash holdings and subsequently pressure management to increase 
distributions (dividends and share buybacks) to investors.  High levels of cash and low 
use of debt would be consistent with activists addressing agency costs of "free cash flow" 
(Jensen 1986).  Targets also have significantly higher foreign ownership (Pct 
Foreigners).  This may be an important factor as activists, given their minority stakes, 
may have to rely on other "unfriendly (to the issuer)" shareholders to implement the 
changes.  Activist funds tend to target firms outside of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE 
flag).  This implies that target firms are less familiar, possibly neglected by other 
investors.  The second panel of Table 3 shows, however, that funds tend to target more 




5.  What are the Returns to Activist Investors? 
 
We next turn to the question of whether activist engagements create value for other 
shareholders.  We examine stock market returns, both announcement event-day returns 
(the market's short term reaction) and long-run returns.  
 
5.1.  Evidence Around Filing Event Days 
 
We first look at event-day returns and trading around the first filing of a large 
shareholding by an activist investor in our sample.  Figure 3 plots the average buy-and-
hold abnormal return (BHAR) for each trading day around the disclosure filing.  Time 0 
in this graph corresponds to the filing date that an activist investor has a position 
exceeding 5% of outstanding shares in a firm.  The line plots the average buy-and-hold 
return in excess of the buy-and-hold return of the Nikkei Sogo (Comprehensive) Index.  
There is a run-up, on average, of about 1% in the 5 days prior to the filing date and an 
abnormal price jump of about 1% on the filing date.  Naturally, the filing date may not be 
a perfect proxy for when the market learns about the activist's first decision to engage.  
 
Figure 3 also includes the average abnormal turnover in the event stocks (bars in red).  
This is calculated by average daily stock trading volume divided by average in the 
preceding (-100, -40) trading days.  There is some evidence that volume is 50% higher 
around the filing date than the average volume in the period prior to the event.  This 
could be a direct result of the activist fund acquiring his stake (or building a "toehold" in 
the firm) or other investors also trading around the activist engagement date.  Two 
possible explanations are "wolf packing" (several activist funds coordinating to buy into 
the target firms) or "herding" (investors trading on the information of the activist fund 
and also buying shares on the firm).  In terms of "wolf packing," we find that in 112 of 
the 786 unique firms targeted by an activist investor in our sample a second block by 
another activist investor in the overall sample period.  In untabulated analysis, we also 
examine "herding" by collecting block acquisition filings by 62 other (non-activist) 
institutional investors like Barclays Global Investors, JP Morgan Asset Management, 
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Fidelity Investment or domestic ones like Daiwa Securities Investment Trust 
Management, Nomura Asset Management and Tower Investment Advisors.  We find that 
non-activists institutions also formed a block exceeding 5% of the shares in 485 firms of 
the 786 firms with a first filing (out of 916 total filings) of a large shareholding by an 
activist investor in our sample.  Non-activist institutional blocks seem to act as 
"facilitators" of activist funds strategy. 
 
Table 4 reports that the average BHAR for the (-5,+5) trading days window for 864 
events in our sample for which we have complete price data is +1.8%.22  This figure is 
lower than the average abnormal returns around activist block acquisition disclosure 
found in U.S. activist hedge studies that range from 7% (Brav et al. 2008) to 3.6% 
(Greenwood and Schor 2009).   
  
We also explore the cross-sectional variation in the market response to investor activism. 
In Panel A of Table 4 we break down events by investor type.   As explained section 3.1 
above, we use press reports to identify "hostile" funds.  Results show that reaction is 
more positive for events by "hostile" funds.  In fact, average abnormal returns are +3.8% 
for these cases.  Announcement returns are not significantly different from zero for "non-
hostile" activist fund cases.  Secondly, we find that the price reaction is more positive for 
events  where the investor filed with an indication of possibly making a "significant 
proposal" (which became mandatory after January 2007, introduced by the government 
as a reaction to the activities of the Murakami funds).  Thirdly, if one uses the post-2007 
behavior (i.e., whether the investor ever file giving it the possibility of making 
"significant proposal" in its post-2007 targets or not) and use it to "fill back" for the 
earlier period, we find that price reaction is again only positive for events involving 
investors with a more activist stance.  So, overall, results suggest that there are gains from 
activism to public shareholders in the cases where activist funds are more "aggressive."  
Interestingly, news of activist stakes by domestic investors seem to be slightly more well 
received by the market. 
                                                 
22 The sample for these tests includes all firms with price data and is not limited to non-financial firms like 
in Tables 2 and 3. 
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 We also look at average announcement effects for the individual events involving each of 
the specific 4 activist investors we portrayed in Section 3.2 above.  It seems that both of 
the two top hostile investors (Steel Partners and Murakami) have a more significant 
positive impact on market prices around the announcement of their stakes.  In fact, we do 
not find a statistically significant effect for the first filing announcements by Sparx.  
 
In Panel B of Table 4, we look at market reaction depending on the ex post outcome. 
First, events are broken down by whether the event target firm underwent significant 
structural changes which is determined ex post based on subsequent corporate action 
event filings on the target firm (but not known at the announcement date).  This is 
motivated by the Greenwood and Schor (2009) result for the U.S. that most of the returns 
of activism are driven by the ability of hedge fund activists to force targets into a 
takeover.  As is evident from the sub-panel "Structural Changes" firms that had no 
subsequent corporate events had slightly lower market announcement effects at the 
formation of the activist stake but very few targeted firms were eventually delisted 
(meaning the target firm as a legal entity eventually ceased to exist as a product of an 
eventual takeover (including management buyout) or bankruptcy).  More details on this 
are offered in Section 6.2 below.  Second, events are broken down by whether target firm 
resisted by adopting a "poison pill" takeover defense or not.  More details on the specific 
defense measures are described in Section 6.3 below.  Results are not clear cut, although 
it seems market factored in more positive news in cases where firm eventually introduced 
defense while activist had position. 
 
5.2.  Evidence on Long-run Returns 
 
One concern with the results in section 5.1 above is that the positive buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns may be a short-lived price reaction.  To better assess whether there are 
actual value improvements stemming from activist engagements we examine buy-and-
hold returns over the full duration of the activist funds' investments. 
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Panel A of Table 5 reports statistics on abnormal buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) 
for the total duration of the activists' engagements.  Buy-and-hold returns are computed 
beginning in the day of the announced activism through the day in which the funds exit.  
Exit is defined if the last available position filing is below 6%.  If no exit information is 
available, we assume that the holding lasts until the end of the sample (June 2009).  We 
find that, on average, total deal holding-period raw returns are a negative -2.44%.  But 
since many of the events occurred in a time period when the Japanese stock market fell, 
we actually find that the buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR), net of Nikkei Sogo 
Index are on average +4.57% for the activist funds.  Given that a large majority of activist 
engagements span more than one year, the annualized BHAR is only +1.39%.  These 
BHAR figures are economically very small and much lower than results found for hedge 
fund activism in the U.S. by Brav et al. (2008) and other papers.  Of course, the activism 
studied in by Brav et al. (2008) occurred in a bull period in the U.S. market.  
 
We conduct a more formal long-term return analysis using calendar time portfolio returns 
(CTPR).  We form portfolios by buying firms that were targeted by activist investors at 
the time of disclosure by activist investors.  This methodology that best approximates the 
actual returns to activist investors and can also be replicated by "copycat" investors based 
on the mandatory activist position filings. 
 
First, we form an Equal-Weighted (EW) portfolio that is long in equal amounts on all 
open positions by activist funds in target stocks at each point in time.  We add a new 
position and rebalance the portfolio whenever there is a new filing disclosing an activist 
investment exceeding 5% of outstanding shares in a firm.  The position is terminated if 
the activist's position falls below 6% (i.e., if the investor "exited").  The portfolio is 
formed with equal weights in all event stocks.  Panel A of Figure 4 illustrates the daily 
returns to following this EW strategy for our sample of activism events over the full 
sample period.  To track its performance, we take a normalized index equal to 100 on 
July 1, 2007 (the first time there were simultaneously 10 open activism engagements) and 
update it using CTPR EW index (t) = CTPR EW index (t-1) * (1 + avg(RET(t)) where 
avg(RET(t)) = equally-weighted average total return (i.e., including dividends, etc) of all 
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stocks with at least one activist position >0.  We can see from the graph that in the years 
2004 and 2005 the portfolio of activist stakes yield positive returns and that the portfolio 
outperformed broad measures of the market (Nikkei Sogo Index and the TOPIX23) and 
even outperformed small cap and small value stocks (Russell Nomura Small Caps and 
Russell Nomura Small Value).  However, after the stock market started to fall after 2006 
the gains of the activist EW portfolio were lost.  By the end of our sample period (June 
2009) the EW portfolio had outperformed the broad market like Nikkei Comprehensive 
Index and TOPIX but only very marginally the Russell Nomura Small Value for the 
overall period from July 2001 to June 2009. 
 
Panel B of Figure 4 presents alternatively the performance of the VW (Value-Weighted) 
portfolio of event firms which is a portfolio that is long on all target stocks with weights 
in proportion to the yen positions held by each activist fund in each firm.  The yen 
positions are calculated by multiplying (% held by activist) * (Market Cap of firm).  We 
add a position when there is a new filing disclosing that a position exceeds 5% of 
outstanding shares in a firm.  The position is rebalanced any time an institution 
subsequently revises the disclosure (say to a larger stake like 7%).  The position is 
terminated if it falls below 6% and there is no subsequent filing.  We track the VW 
portfolio performance by the yen position in each stock times the total return of that stock 
each day.  The plot shows a better performance for activist VW portfolio.  The VW 
portfolio strongly outperformed the broad market (Nikkei Sogo Index and TOPIX) as 
well as indices tracking small caps and small value (Russell Nomura Small and Russell 
Nomura Small Value) for the overall period from July 2001 to June 2009.  Comparing the 
EW and VW portfolio results, we conclude that the larger sized activist investments (in 
yen) proved more successful but not all activist investment stakes. 
 
Panel B of Table 5 presents the more formal CTPR regression tests.  Instead of daily 
performance, we compute monthly returns for the EW and VW portfolios and regress 
these on contemporaneous the market excess return (Market), the size factor (SMB) and 
                                                 
23 TOPIX is a dividend-reinvested value-weighted index of all stocks traded on the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
Section One. 
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the value factor (HML) for the Japanese market.24  The positive factor loadings on the 
SMB and HML factors suggest that activist fund strategy load on small and value stocks.  
 
The test of over-performance of activist investors is whether the "alpha" (the regression 
intercept of portfolio returns on the return factor) is positive.  Results in Panel B of Table 
5 show that the alpha for EW portfolio is not statistically different from zero.  In contrast, 
the monthly alpha for the VW portfolio is statistically greater than zero at 1.0% per 
month (about 12.7% in annualized terms).  Overall, the evidence from CTPR EW and 
VW analysis suggests that activist investment gains were concentrated in large stocks and 
did not extend to all targeted firms (namely the smaller caps).   
 
 
6.  Do Activists Have an Impact on Targeted Firms? 
 
6.1.  Detailed Analysis of the Success of Activist Campaigns 
 
As described in Section 3.1, activist investors who engage in the act of making 
"significant proposals" must explicitly indicate such an intention in the block-
shareholding report after January 1, 2007 (Financial Instruments and Exchange Law, 
Article 27, No. 26).  Many of the funds submitted new or revised reports stating such 
intentions.  Although there is also an item in the form where investors can fill out their 
exact proposals, unfortunately there has not been a report with explicit description of 
such proposals.25  We therefore conducted a newspaper and magazine search for publicly 
released proposals through Nikkei Telecom 21 using target firm name and fund name as 
keywords.26   We found articles on 234 significant proposals made to 88 different target 
firms in the press. 
                                                 
24 These factors are computed as in Kubota and Takehara (2007). 
25 This differs from the U.S. 13-D schedule where it is customary that the investors more explicitly state 
their purpose of transaction in "Item 4."  The schedule13-D also has a list of 10 examples of important 
actions that the investors may take.  The Japanese form does not indicate any example of "significant 
proposals," which are separately itemized in a Cabinet Order into 13 categories.  
26 The universe of newspapers include Nihon Keizai Shinbun, Nikkei Industrial Newspaper, Nikkei MJ, 
Nikkei Veritas, Nikkei Financial, Asahi Shinbun, Yomiuri Shinbun, and Mainichi Sinbun.  Magazines 
include Nikkei Business, Weekly Toyo Keizai, Weekly Diamond, and Weekly Economist (ekonomisuto). 
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Panel A of Table 6 summarizes these proposals that the activist funds communicated with 
the target firms after engaging in activism investment.  We group these proposals into 
four broad categories: (i) general requests; (ii) major reorganizations and operational 
changes (like M&As, asset sales, MBOs); (iii) capital structure changes (payout policy 
and capital structure); (iv) governance changes (board, executive compensation, charter 
provisions, etc).  Naturally, the different objectives are not mutually exclusive.  
Interestingly, the data reveals that the most frequent proposals deal with payout policy 
(70 proposals for dividend increases and share buybacks) and less frequently with major 
reorganizations.  
 
We use news searches corporate filings and analyze company financials and determine 
success on a proposal if the activist fund stated goals were achieved. There is 
considerable heterogeneity in success rates.  Success is highest for proposals dealing with 
payout policy (43% for dividend increases and 69% for share buybacks) and lowest for 
major reorganizations (18% for M&As and 0% for asset sales).  
 
Panel B of Table 6, events are broken down by whether the event target firm underwent 
significant structural changes which is determined ex post based on subsequent corporate 
action event filings (but not known at the announcement date).  Data on filings of 
corporate restructuring are taken from Nikkei Financial Quest and indicate whether the 
target firm: i) was delisted; ii) was acquired by another firm and consolidated; iii) was 
divided; or iv) was divided but continued.  For the complete sample of 786 targeted firms 
(targeted in 916 activism events), only 269 were subject to any corporate change either as 
target or acquirer in M&A or restructuring.  Interestingly, only 35 target firms were 
eventually delisted (meaning the target firm as a legal entity eventually ceased to exist as 
a product of an eventual takeover or bankruptcy).  So about two thirds of the targeted 
firms never underwent a significant change that would require a filing with the securities 
regulator.  This is different from the hedge fund activism wave in the U.S. (Greenwood 
and Schor 2009) where most of the returns of activism are driven by the ability of hedge 
fund activists to force targets into a takeover.  
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 6.2.  Target Firm Performance Before and After Investor Activism 
 
We examine more broadly whether there are real effects of activist engagements.  In 
Table 7 we examine the ex post performance of all 858 targeted firms versus 
industry/size/book-to-market matching companies (as described in Tables 2 and 3 and 
Section 4) in the two years before and the two years after being targeted by activist funds.  
Event year is the year of first filing of a 5% or greater stake by an activist investor.  We 
report t-statistics for whether the average of each variable is equal for the two years 
before versus the two years after being targeted by activist funds.  We perform the test 
both for event firms and for matching companies. 
 
In Panel A of Table 7, we test if the activist campaigns influence firm performance by 
looking at two operational measures (ROA, Growth) but find that both deteriorate in 
target firms.  However, ROA also deteriorates in matched firms whereas sales growth 
actually improves for matching firms in the sample period.  So there is no evidence that 
activists successfully improve company performance.  
 
We find some support that activists have an impact on financial policies (Panel B of 
Table 7).  Given that activists demand both higher dividends and share repurchases we 
focus on the total payout measure.  Panel B.4 shows that overall payout ratios improve 
for target firms (but not for matching firms).  This supports the general perception that 
the main strategy employed by activist investors in Japan consists of taking stakes in 
firms and successfully persuading management to increase payouts.  
 
Finally, we look at governance and ownership changes but results are not different for 
target and comparable firms in Panel C of Table 7.  Both target and matching firms show 
some effort of making management more incentive-oriented by introducing executive 
stock option plans.  Also both target and matching firms increased the percentage of 
independent directors, but there is no significant difference between the two groups.  On 
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the other hand, significantly more target firms introduced board with "committees,"27 
even thought the percentage itself is still small (at 2.2% two years after firms were 
targeted).  In unreported tests, we also find that the turnover of CEO, which is measured 
by the change in the first-named representative director (daihyo torishimariyaku) does 
not show any change for target firms over time or difference from matched firms.  
Overall, the results on the corporate governance measures indicate that in Japan, even 
though the activist engagements have some impact on target firms, funds themselves are 
not able to exert strong influence on the management and the CEO.  Panel C.4 also shows 
that both target and matched firms experience an increased percentage of shares held by 
foreign investors significantly, but the target firms are much more heavily invested by 
foreigners. 
 
In the final sub-panel we look at the adoption of "poison pills."  Panel C.5 shows that 
while both target and peer firms introduced defense measures, the adoption rate was 
faster in targeted firms (from 0.1% two years before to 11% two years after activism). 
We examine this in more detail in the next sub-section.  
 
 
6.3. Adoption of Poison Pills by Firms in Reaction to Investor Activism 
 
One dimension in which investor activism seems to have had a major effect is in the 
adoption by Japanese firms of "poison pill" takeover defense measures.  We collected 
data from MARR a magazine published by Recof Data, a division of Recof the leading 
M&A consulting company in Japan.  Inexistent up until 2005, the first case of "poison 
pill" was adopted by Nireco (March 2005) and then Panasonic (April 2005).  Upon 
Nireco's announcement that it would exercise the plan in June 2005, the SFP Value 
Realization Master Fund, Ltd., the activist hedge fund, appealed to the Tokyo District 
Court.  In June 2005, both the District Court and the High Court ruled out Nireco's 
defense plan since it had only been decided by the board meeting without approval of the 
shareholders' meeting.  Another test case for whether exercising "poison pills" can be 
                                                 
27 Since April 2003, Japanese firms may choose to have a committee (nomination, audit and compensation) 
system.   Independent directors must constitute a majority of each committee.  See Appendix A for details.  
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upheld by courts was the targeting of Bulldog Sauce by Steel Partners, the activist hedge 
fund, and the Supreme Court decision to uphold it in 2007.  These events bear some 
resemblance to the importance of the 1985 Supreme Court decision in Moran v. 
Household International, Inc. for the spread of "poison pills" in the U.S.  From 2005 to 
the end of 2009, a total of 604 firms in Japan adopted a takeover defense measure.  With 
close to about 4,000 publicly listed firms, about one-sixth of firms now have a "poison 
pill" in place. 
 
As described in Arikawa and Mitsusada (2008), there are two types of "poison pills" in 
Japan.  The "prior warning" type is a takeover defense approved in advance which 
defines a rule that must be followed by a party pursuing a takeover of target firm, and 
breach of the rule by the acquirers leads to the actual measures, such as the issuance of 
new stock reservation rights.  The second type is a "rights plan" which involves the actual 
issuance of new stock reservation rights in advance to a trust bank or special purpose 
corporation, and if the takeover event occurs they will be allocated to the shareholders. 
 
Panel A of Table 8 breaks down by "poison pills" by type.  It shows that "Type 1 - Prior-
Warning" are by far the most common form and that about of the defense measures were 
approved in a shareholder meetings ("SH mtg approval").  Defense measures are also 
broken down by trigger level the acquirer has to reach for defense to be activated.  By far, 
the most common level is when acquirer achieves a 20% stake.  As we found in Section 
3.3, the activist funds in our sample accumulate ownership stakes in the range of 5 to 
10%, so typically falling short of trigger levels of these defense measures. 
  
Panel B of Table 8 analyzes the adoption of takeover defense measures by firms targeted 
by activist investors.  We find that firms targeted by activists were more likely to adopt a 
"poison pill" measure after being targeted with 170 of the 759 firms introducing them (an 
adoption rate of 24%).  In terms of timing of adoption, most adoptions are in year 
following the activist target date (year T) and in subsequent years.  This time pattern 
strongly suggest the adoption is a reaction to investor targeting.  
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 7.  Conclusions 
 
This paper provides a comprehensive examination of the first decade of investor activism 
in Japan.  We show that there is, on average, a modest positive market reaction to 
announcements of activist investments.  We document that these effects are concentrated 
in events involving hostile funds.  When we examine returns to activism in the long run 
we find that gains are not significant overall, but concentrated on large target firms.  We 
find that target firms tend to increase their payouts relative to peer firms after being 
targeted but we fail to find evidence that activists force target firm managers to institute 
any major operational improvements.  
 
The main contribution of our paper is to document the limited success of investor 
activism in Japan.  Our findings are important to the literature on investor activism that 
has examined activity only in the U.S. and Europe.  Despite the high potential to unlock 
shareholder value in Japan, activist successes are limited to increases in shareholder 
payouts but stay short of major reorganizations.  This could be explained by a very thin 
M&A market and "bear" conditions in Japan's stock market after 2007. Indeed we show 
that very few target firms were subsequently taken over. Additionally, we show that there 
was an explosion in the number of firms that adopted "poison pill" defense measures. 
These conclusions are related to the most recent literature on hedge fund activism that 
documents that returns in the U.S. are limited to the ability of hedge fund activists to 
force targets into a takeover.  Greenwood and Schor (2009) find that activist investors 
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Panel A: Events by Activist Investors 
The sample consists of 916 activism events (where an institution discloses a position of 5% or greater ownership in a firm) over the period from January 1998 to March 2009.  A 
total of 759 unique firms were targeted.  This panel breaks down the number of events by each of the 34 activist investors.  Investors are grouped in terms of: i) their top 
management's nationality (Foreign vs. Japanese); ii) the perceived attitude towards management (Hostile vs. Non-Hostile) as reported in press articles; iii) whether the investor 
filed an indication of possibly making "significant proposals" (which became mandatory after January 2007 – we use the post-2007 behavior by the institution to "fill back" for the 







Nationality Perceived Attitude Filed a Significant Proposal Number of Investments by Year
Investor Name 0=Domestic 1=Foreign 0="Non-hostile" 1="Hostile" 0=No Proposals 1=Proposals 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total
Arnhold and S Bleichroeder 0 43 43 0 0 43 0 0 0 0 2 4 10 4 2 12 8 1 43
Asuka Asset Management 0 7 7 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 5 0 0 7
Atlantis 0 77 77 0 77 0 0 1 2 5 11 13 11 14 11 6 0 3 77
Brandes 0 34 0 34 0 34 0 0 0 0 5 2 4 5 5 11 2 0 34
DKR 0 37 37 0 37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 22 4 2 0 37
Dalton 0 44 0 44 0 44 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 7 23 7 4 0 44
Effissimo 12 0 0 12 0 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 6 0 12
Fugen Capital 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Harbinger Capital 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 3
Harris Associates 0 11 0 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 2 4 1 0 11
Henderson 0 2 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2
Ichigo 0 15 15 0 0 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 7 0 15
Liberty Square 0 14 0 14 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 9 1 1 14
Marathon 0 27 27 0 27 0 0 0 0 0 6 7 4 5 0 1 3 1 27
Murakami 64 0 0 64 0 64 0 0 2 7 7 2 11 17 18 0 0 0 64
NWQ 0 7 0 7 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 0 0 0 7
OCM 0 27 27 0 0 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 9 7 3 1 0 27
Perry Corp 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
SK Capital 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Safe Harbor 0 2 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2
Sandringham 0 13 0 13 0 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 1 1 4 0 13
Silchester International 0 50 0 50 0 50 1 0 5 3 8 1 0 4 2 14 12 0 50
Simplex 12 0 12 0 0 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 6 2 2 12
Southeastern 0 9 0 9 0 9 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 1 0 3 0 0 9
Sparx 245 0 245 0 0 245 0 2 1 13 8 17 28 53 62 51 9 1 245
Steel Partners 0 41 0 41 0 41 0 0 0 0 4 7 21 5 2 2 0 0 41
TCIF 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
TIAA-CREF 0 5 5 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 5
TZCS 10 0 0 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 2 0 3 0 0 10
Taiyo 0 19 19 0 0 19 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 4 3 2 3 0 19
The SFP Value 0 28 0 28 0 28 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 10 8 4 0 0 28
Third Avenue 0 10 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 5 1 0 10
Trade Winds 0 14 0 14 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 2 2 14
Wellington 0 30 30 0 30 0 0 0 0 2 4 3 4 4 6 3 4 0 30
Overall Total 345 571 560 356 246 670 1 3 10 32 56 62 119 168 189 189 76 11 916
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Table  1 (Cont.) 
 
Panel B: Events by Targeted Firms 
 
This panel presents the number of firms matched to information in the Nikkei non-financial firms dataset.  It also 
breaks down events by the exchange (and section) where the target firm stock is listed at the time of the event and the 
Nikkei industry group where they operate. TSE = Tokyo Stock Exchange; OSE = Osaka Stock Exchange; NSE = 
Nagoya Stock Exchange; FSE = Fukuoka Stock Exchange ; SSE Ambitious = Sapporo Stock Exchange "Ambitious" 
Market; JASDAQ = Japan Association for Securities Dealers Quote System; Hercules = Osaka Stock Exchange 
Hercules Market.  If a stock is dually listed, we report the largest exchange where it is listed. 
 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total
Nr of Firms Targeted 1 3 10 32 56 62 119 168 189 189 76 11 916
Nr of Firms Targeted Matched to Nikkei 1 3 8 29 56 61 118 159 178 168 68 9 858
Nr of Firms Targeted by Stock Exchange
TSE 1st section 1 4 13 29 26 59 69 78 93 43 6 421
TSE 2nd section 3 3 10 5 12 13 18 13 6 1 84
TSE Mothers 3 2 2 2 8 8 3      28
OSE 1st section 1 2 2 2 7 8 8 3      33
OSE 2nd section 5 8 8 7 5 2 35
NSE 2nd section 1 3 1 1 1      7
NSE Centrex 4 1      5
Other Regional 2 3 1 2 9 12 22 8 2 61
FSE 2      2
SSE Ambitious 1      1
JASDAQ 3 9 12 21 28 48 43 34 8      206
Hercules Growth 2 1 3 4      10
Hercules Standard 1 1 4 4 6 3 4      23
Nr of Firms Targeted by Nikkei Industry Group
01_Foods 1 3 1 10 8 8 7 1 1 40
03_Textile Products 1 4 4 2 1 2 2      16
05_Pulp & Paper 1 1 1      3
07_Chemicals 1 1 3 13 12 5 9 3      47
09_Drugs 1 4 3 5 4 4 1      22
11_Petroleum 2      2
13_Rubber Products 1      1
15_Stone, Clay & Glass Products 1 3 1      5
17_Iron & Steel 1 2 2 1 3      9
19_Non ferrous Metal & Metal Products 1 1 2 3 5 2 3 9      26
21_Machinery 1 1 5 14 15 12 12 7 1 68
23_Electric & Electronic Equipment 1 3 4 3 12 16 17 21 7 2 86
25_Shipbuilding & Repairing 1 1      2
27_Motor Vehicles & Auto Parts 2 1 2 3 1 5      14
29_Transportation Equipment 1 1 1      3
31_Precision Equipment 1 1 6 6 2 2      18
33_Other Manufacturing 2 2 1 4 6 11 6 8 4      44
35_Fish & Marine Products 1 1      2
37_Mining 1 2      3
41_Construction 1 2 1 4 4 4 6 8      30
43_Wholesale Trade 1 6 6 6 6 17 24 17 6 1 90
45_RetailTrade 1 2 5 8 7 7 10 19 11 2      72
53_Real Estate 1 1 1 3 1 3 8 5 5      28
55_Railroad Transportation 1      1
57_Trucking 1 1 2 2 2 1 9
59_Sea Transportation 1      1
61_Air Transportation 0
63_Warehousing & Harbor Transportation 3 1 2 5 1 1 13
65_Communication Services 1 3 3 3 2      12
67_Utilities - Electric 1      1
69_Utilities - Gas 1      1
71_Services 1 2 5 10 12 21 33 49 38 16 2 189
1 3 8 29 56 61 118 159 178 168 68 9 858
Not Matched to Nikkei (Financial firms) 0 0 2 3 0 1 1 9 11 21 8 2 58  
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Table 1 (Cont.) 
 
Panel C: Capital Committed and Length of Activist Investments 
 
This panel presents the size of activist stakes both in terms of millions of yen (at cost) and as a percentage of the 
outstanding shares of the target companies.  The "initial" rows represent the stakes that activist investors had at their 
initial EDINET filing. The "maximum" rows reports the maximum reported stakes that the funds accumulated in the 
targets as revealed by subsequent EDINET filing.  We also list statistics for the length of the holding period (in number 
of calendar and trading days) of the activist positions. 
 
 
 Mean Median Min Max
Invested Capital (in Yen milions)
 - Initial Position 7,753 2,078 50 240,922
 - Maximum Position 13,444 3,378 73 506,022
Percentage Ownership
 - Initial Position 6.82% 5.41% 2.54% 60.45%
 - Maximum Position 9.89% 7.40% 2.54% 87.56%
Length of Holding Period
- Number of calendar days 791 640 1 3,471
- Number of trading days 533 432 1 2,335
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Table 2 
Characteristics of Target Companies 
 
This tables reports the characteristics of target companies and comparisons with the set of industry/size/book-to-market matched companies for each target.  The first four columns 
report the number, mean, median, and standard deviation of the characteristics for the target companies.  Columns 5 through 8 report equivalent statistics for the matched firms.  
The last column presents the t-statistics for whether average of each variable is equal for target and matched firms.  All variables are retrieved from Nikkei Portfolio Master 
Database for the last fiscal year-end prior to the event year. The sample is limited to non-financial firms. Size is Total Value of Assets measured in millions of yen.  MB is the 
market-to-book ratio defined as (market value of equity/ book value of equity).  Mktcap is market capitalization in millions of yen.  Tobin Q is defined as (book value of debt + 
market value of equity)/(book value of debt + book value of equity); Growth is the growth rate of sales over the previous year; ROA is return on assets (net income / total assets); 
Past 2-Year Return is the buy-and-hold return during the 24 months before the announced activism; Leverage is the book leverage ratio defined as debt/(debt + book value of 
equity); Cash-to-Assets is defined as (cash + marketable securities)/ total assets; Dividend Yield is annual dividend divided by year-end closing price; Payout is dividends plus 
repurchases per year/retained earnings.;  Pct Floating is the % of outstanding shares that are freely floated in the stock market; Pct Directors is the % of outstanding shares that are 
held by directors; Pct Foreigners is the % of outstanding shares that are held by foreign investors; Stock Options Dummy is 1 if a firms adopts executive stock options, and 0 if not; 
Board Committee Flag is 1 if company board is based on independent directors and 0 if it is auditor-based; Pct Outside Directors is percentage of independent directors divided by 
total board size; Poison Pill is 1 if the firm has an active takeover defense measure and 0 otherwise; TSE flag is a dummy variable that equals one if firm stock is listed at the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange; Stock Turnover is share volume (Datastream item VO) divided by adjusted shares outstanding (Datastream items NOSH/AF) during the previous year.  
 
  Dependent variable: Dummy of Being Targeted = 1
Coefficient Z p-value Marginal Prob. Coefficient Z p-value Marginal Prob.
Mktcap (log) 0.0007 0.03 0.98 0.02% -0.0068 -0.24 0.81 -0.17%
Tobin Q -0.0481 -2.04** 0.04 -1.23% -0.0660 -2.35** 0.02 -1.65%
Growth -0.2321 -1.75* 0.08 -5.93% -0.3025 -1.91* 0.06 -7.55%
ROA -0.4141 -1.96** 0.05 -10.59% -0.3519 -1.40 0.16 -8.78%
Past 2-Year Return 0.2334 1.77* 0.08 5.97% 0.2279 1.27 0.20 5.69%
Leverage -0.8702 -6.41*** 0.00 -22.25% -0.7943 -4.95*** 0.00 -19.83%
Cash-to-Assets 0.8008 3.75*** 0.00 20.48% 0.7409 2.93*** 0.00 18.50%
Payout -0.0243 -1.00 0.32 -0.62% -0.0483 -1.67* 0.09 -1.21%
Pct Floating -0.0023 -0.89 0.37 -0.06% -0.0060 -1.9* 0.06 -0.15%
Pct Directors 0.0015 0.61 0.54 0.04% -0.0001 -0.03 0.98 0.00%
Pct Foreigners 0.0252 9.72*** 0.00 0.64% 0.0222 7.33*** 0.00 0.55%
Stock Options Dummy 0.0814 1.55 0.12 2.10% 0.0272 0.43 0.67 0.68%
Pct Outside Directors -0.3403 -1.45 0.15 -8.49%
Poison Pill 0.1775 1.33 0.18 4.89% 0.1403 0.89 0.37 3.72%
TSE flag -0.1050 -2.71*** 0.01 -2.69% -0.1022 -2.24** 0.03 -2.55%
Stock Turnover 0.0712 3.34*** 0.00 1.78%
Constant -0.7029 -2.54*** 0.01 -0.5507 -1.63 0.10
Nr of Observations 3723 2706
Pseudo R2 8.4% 7.5%
Percent Targeted 19.2% 18.2%
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 Table 3 
Probit Analysis: Which Firms Get Targeted? 
 
This tables reports the characteristics of firms associated with probability of being targeted by an activist investor.  The dependent variables is equal to one if an activist fund 
targeted the firm or zero if firm is a industry/size/book-to-market matched company.  All explanatory variables are defined in Table 2. The sample is limited to non-financial firms. 
We report probit coefficients, the Z-statistics, and the marginal probability change induced by a one-standard deviation change in the values of the explanatory variable from their 
respective sample averages.  ∗**,** and ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 
Target Firms (Dummy of Being Targeted = 1) Matching Firms (Dummy of Being Targeted = 0 ) T-Stat
Number Mean Median Stdev Number Mean Median Stdev Mean Diff (1=0)
Size (Assets mln) 856 151,563 39,866 391,174 3,619 153,764 35,123 464,291 -0.125
MB 830 2.023 1.328 2.181 3,537 2.096 1.352 2.312 -0.823
Mktcap 854 113,687 29,795 287,471 3,615 102,729 20,795 357,056 0.839
Tobin Q 854 1.594 1.172 1.473 3,615 1.643 1.141 1.673 -0.793
Growth 777 0.052 0.033 0.200 3,296 0.064 0.039 0.211 -1.561
ROA 851 0.021 0.033 0.140 3,577 0.020 0.025 0.100 0.306
Past 2-Year Return 785 (0.001) (0.012) 0.192 3,175 (0.013) (0.019) 0.184 1.623
Leverage 856 0.406 0.387 0.213 3,608 0.493 0.501 0.220 -10.475***
Cash-to-Assets 856 0.196 0.166 0.151 3,608 0.163 0.117 0.154 5.707***
Dividend Yield 842 0.014 0.013 0.010 3,522 0.013 0.012 0.010 2.164**
Payout 851 0.493 0.286 0.930 3,577 0.473 0.270 1.005 0.503
Pct Floating 830 18.320 15.950 11.246 3,491 21.092 19.400 12.045 -5.986***
Pct Directors 854 7.621 0.999 12.263 3,604 6.720 0.575 11.901 1.968**
Pct Foreigners 854 13.185 11.374 11.677 3,604 7.346 2.784 10.612 14.171***
Stock Options Dummy 849 0.465 0.000 0.499 3,588 0.418 0.000 0.493 2.481**
Board Committee Flag 737 0.016 0.000 0.127 3,120 0.021 0.000 0.144 -0.845
Pct Outside Directors 737 0.075 0.000 0.131 3,120 0.081 0.000 0.131 -1.1
Poison Pill 856 0.039 0.000 0.193 3,619 0.023 0.000 0.151 2.477**
TSE flag 856 0.723 1.000 0.682 3,609 0.761 1.000 0.748 -1.373




Short-Run Event Returns  
 
This tables reports the average Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return (BHAR) in excess of the buy-and-hold return of the 
Nikkei Sogo Comprehensive Index in the (-5:+5) trading days event window around the filing date in EDINET that an 
activist investor has a position exceeding 5% of outstanding shares in a target firm. In Panel A, events are broken down 
by Investor Type: i) the perceived attitude towards management as reported in press articles (hostile vs. non-hostile); ii) 
whether the investor filed an indication of possibly making "significant proposals" (which became mandatory only after 
January 2007); iii) whether the investor post-2007 ever filed an indication of making "significant proposals" and use 
this to "fill back" for the earlier period;  iv) the nationality of activist investor (foreign vs. Japan-based); v) for selected 
top activist funds.  Table 1 (Panel A) provides classification of each of the 34 investors in our sample.  In Panel B, 
events are broken down by ex post outcome (not known at announcement date): i) whether event stock underwent 
significant structural changes based on corporate action event filings; ii) whether target firm resisted by adopting a 






Nr Average BHAR (-5, +5) p-value
All Events 864 1.79%*** 0.0%
Panel A - By Investor Type
Based on Press Reports
- "Hostile" 341 3.83%*** 0.0%
- "Non-Hostile" 523 0.46% 28.5%
Type of Filing 
- Events with a "Significant Proposal" filing (only after 2007) 162 2.64%*** 0.0%
- All other events 702 1.60%*** 0.0%
Using Filing and Looking Back
- Investors that file "Significant Proposal" after 2007 653 2.32%*** 0.0%
- Investors that DO NOT file "Significant Proposal" after 2007 211 0.16% 86.7%
Nationaility of Investor
- Foreign Activist fund 538 1.51%*** 0.1%
- Domestic Activist fund 145 2.39%*** 0.5%
Top Activist Funds
- Steel Partners (foreign, hostile) 41 7.90%*** 0.0%
- Murakami (domestic, hostile) 60 6.52%*** 0.0%
- Taiyo (foreign, non-hostile) 19 3.67%** 3.7%
- Sparx (domestic, non-hostile) 232 0.88% 13.3%
Panel B - By Outcome (Ex-Post):
Structural Changes (Based on Corporate Action Events)
- Target Firm had no subsequent corporate events 645 1.75%*** 0.0%
- Target firm was delisted 43 2.28% 10.6%
- Target firm had other corporate events 183 1.88%*** 0.3%
Poison Pill Adoption by Target Firm
- Firms that never adopted defense 671 1.80%*** 0.0%
- Firms that introduced defense while activist had position 89 3.28%*** 0.0%
- Firms had defense before activist inititated position 42 1.49% 43.7%
- Firms had defense only after activist terminated position 62 -0.23% 81.7%
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Table 5 
Long-Run Event Returns  
 
This table reports statistics on long-term abnormal returns associated with hedge fund activism.  Panel A reports the 
abnormal buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR).  It reports the average, median, minimum and maximum raw and 
annualized deal holding-period returns for the activist funds.  Buy-and-hold returns are computed beginning in the day 
of the announced activism through the day in which the funds exit.  Exit is defined as the first EDINET filing below 
6%.  If no exit information is available, we assume that the holding lasts till the end of the sample (June 2009). Panel B 
reports the Calendar Time Portfolio returns (CTPR).  These regression estimates and t-statistics from equal- and value-
weighted calendar-time portfolio regressions.  "Alpha" is the estimate of the regression intercept from the factor 
models.  "Beta" are the factor loading on: the market excess return - Beta (Market), the Size factor - Beta (SMB) and 
the Value factor Beta (HML).  The monthly factor returns for Japan are obtained from Nikkei, which are based on 
Kubota and Takehara (2007).  ∗**,** and ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 
Nr BHR BHAR BHR BHAR
raw returns net of Nikkei raw returns net of Nikkei
(annualized) (annualized)
All Deals 908 -2.44% 4.57% -3.80% 1.39%
By Investor Type (based on press reports)
- "Hostile" 354 3.98% 13.48% -1.44% 6.58%
- "Non-Hostile" 554 -6.53% -1.14% -5.30% -1.93%
Equally-Weighted Portfolio (EW) monthly returns
coefficient t-statistic
Alpha 0.002 1.01
Beta (Market) 1.042 22.60***
Beta (SMB) 0.913 10.53***
Beta (HML) 0.379 4.05***
Adjusted R-squared 86%
Nr of observations 96
Value-Weighted Portfolio (VW) monthly returns
coefficient t-statistic
Alpha 0.010 4.84***
Beta (Market) 0.801 20.33***
Beta (SMB) 0.177 2.39**
Beta (HML) 0.160 2.01**
Adjusted R-squared 82%
Avg Nr of event firms in portfolio 96
All Deals
Panel A: Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR)






Outcomes of Activism 
 
Panel A reports outcomes of "significant proposals" as determined by searches in newspapers and magazines. Success 
is determined by whether the activist funds' proposed goal was achieved. The sample is restricted to a set of 234 
proposals made by 88 firms, found in the news search. In Panel B, events are broken down by whether the event target 
firm underwent significant structural changes which is determined ex post based on subsequent corporate action event 
filings on the target firm (but not known at the announcement date). Data on filings of corporate restructuring are taken 




Panel A - Significant Proposals Number of Proposals Number of Successes % Success
General Requests
Firm Should Pursue Strategic Alternatives 22 5 23%
Improvement of Valuation 11 2 18%
Improvement of Information Disclosure 5 1 20%
Major Reorganizations and Operational Changes
Merger, Acquisition or Alliance 17 3 18%
Asset Sale 11 0 0%
Going Private(MBO, MBEO) 10 1 10%
Target to Do Take-Over-Bid (TOB) 7 1 14%
Dissenting to a Merger 3 0 0%
Dissenting to Target's TOB 1 0 0%
Capital Structure
Dividend Increase 35 15 43%
Stock Repurchase 35 24 69%
Changing Capital Structure (incl. canceling cross shareholdings） 13 6 46%
Firm Should Buyback Fund's Stock (greenmail) 4 1 25%
Governance
Changing Outside Directors' Composition 12 6 50%
Introduction of  Executive Stock Options 12 7 58%
Other Proxy Fights 8 2 25%
Replacing the CEO 8 1 13%
Dissenting to the Adoption of Takeover Defense Measures 5 1 20%
Changing the Charter 2 1 50%
Dissenting to Changing Charter 2 0 0%
Others 11 4 36%
Total Number of Proposals 234 81 35%
Total Number of Firms 88 54 61%
Panel B - Structural Changes
Structural Changes (Based on Corporate Action Events)
Target firm was delisted 35 4%
Target firm aquired by another firm and consolidated 149 19%
Target firm was divided 72 9%
Target firm was divided but continued 13 2%
Total Number of Corporate Action Events 269 34%
Total Number of Firms Targeted 786
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Table 7 
Target Firm Performance Before and After Activism  
 
This table reports statistics of target company performance versus a industry/size/book-to-market matched companies in the two years before and the two years after being targeted 
by activist funds.  Event Year is the time of first filing of a 5% or greater stake by an activist investor.  All variables are defined in Table 2.  We report t-statistics for whether 
average of each variable is equal for target and matched firms for each year.  Also we report t-statistics for whether average of each variable is equal for the two years before versus  
the two years after being targeted by activist funds. The sample is limited to non-financial firms (as in Tables 2 and 3).   ∗**,** and ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 




Nr Mean Nr Mean diff Nr Mean Nr Mean diff
Year - 2 721 0.019 3086 0.010 1.09 678 0.048 2780 0.034 1.77*
Year - 1 779 0.024 3330 0.018 1.28 719 0.063 3080 0.052 1.25
Event Year 853 0.021 3587 0.020 0.31 779 0.052 3306 0.065 -1.56
Year + 1 834 0.009 3507 0.009 0.04 821 0.046 3460 0.061 -1.63
Year + 2 744 -0.014 3098 -0.001 -1.27 738 0.043 3080 0.049 -0.72
T-test (y+2) = (y-2) -2.59*** -2.16** -0.93 3.35***
T-Test T-Test T-Test T-Test
Nr Mean Nr Mean diff Nr Mean Nr Mean diff Nr Mean Nr Mean diff Nr Mean Nr Mean diff
Year - 2 729 0.418 3108 0.511 -9.25*** 729 0.204 3108 0.162 6.92*** 714 0.014 3041 0.014 0.87 721 0.424 3084 0.441 -0.5
Year - 1 783 0.410 3361 0.498 -10.23*** 783 0.199 3361 0.164 5.94*** 775 0.013 3292 0.013 0.27 779 0.477 3330 0.473 0.11
Event Year 858 0.406 3618 0.493 -10.47*** 858 0.196 3618 0.163 5.71*** 844 0.014 3530 0.013 2.16** 853 0.492 3587 0.473 0.5
Year + 1 840 0.403 3522 0.488 -9.91*** 840 0.180 3522 0.153 4.84*** 819 0.015 3406 0.014 1.49 833 0.560 3507 0.473 2.21**
Year + 2 749 0.399 3108 0.483 -9.22*** 749 0.170 3108 0.147 4.01*** 709 0.018 2958 0.016 2.36** 744 0.709 3097 0.582 1.98**
T-test (y+2) = (y-2) -5.18*** -6.09*** -10.08*** -13.28*** 4.92*** 7.89*** 3.83*** 3.56***
T-Test T-Test T-Test T-Test T-Test
Nr Mean Nr Mean diff Nr Mean Nr Mean diff Nr Mean Nr Mean diff Nr Mean Nr Mean diff Nr Mean Nr Mean diff
Year - 2 678 0.401 2899 0.357 2.15** 459 0.052 1976 0.068 -2.59*** 459 0.009 1976 0.022 -1.88* 729 10.687 3106 6.284 10.54*** 729 0.001 3109 0.002 -0.15
Year - 1 769 0.432 3296 0.393 1.96** 610 0.057 2655 0.072 -2.66*** 610 0.011 2655 0.021 -1.51 783 11.921 3355 6.906 11.93*** 783 0.014 3365 0.009 1.40
Event Year 851 0.465 3598 0.419 2.48** 739 0.075 3128 0.081 -1.1 739 0.016 3128 0.021 -0.85 856 13.162 3614 7.337 14.17*** 858 0.038 3629 0.023 2.48**
Year + 1 838 0.473 3508 0.425 2.48** 752 0.088 3186 0.090 -0.36 752 0.019 3186 0.024 -0.82 840 15.207 3522 7.694 17.84*** 840 0.080 3525 0.055 2.68***
Year + 2 747 0.481 3102 0.429 2.55** 697 0.094 2942 0.093 0.15 697 0.022 2942 0.021 0.07 749 14.716 3108 7.767 15.52*** 749 0.111 3108 0.077 3.05***
Panel A: Changes in Operational Performance
A.1 - Return on Assets (ROA) A.2 - Sales Growth (Growth)
B.1 - Leverage B.2 - Cash to Assets
Target Firms Matching Firms Matching Firms
B.3 - Dividend Yield B.4 - Payout
Target Firms
Panel B: Financial and Payout Policy
Panel C: Governance and Ownership
C.4 - Percentage Held by Foreigners
Target Firms Matching Firms Target Firms Matching FirmsTarget Firms Matching Firms Target Firms Matching Firms
C.3 - Adoption of "Committee" Board C.5 - Poison Pill Adoption
Target Firms Matching FirmsTarget Firms Matching Firms Target Firms Matching Firms Target Firms Matching FirmsTarget Firms Matching Firms
C.1 - Use of Executive Stock Options Plans C.2 - Board Independence (% Outsiders)
T-test (y+2) = (y-2) 3.40*** 6.66*** 8.46*** 11.89*** 2.25** 1.51 15.80*** 20.13*** 9.64*** 15.72***
  42
Table 8: Adoption of "Poison Pills" as a Reaction to Investor Activism 
 
This table describes the adoption by Japanese firms of "poison pill" takeover defense measures.  The data source is MARR/Recof.  Panel A describe the adoption of defense 
measures by all firms in Japan per year.  Defense measures are broken down by type: i) a "prior-warning" that firm will issue new stock reservation rights if acquirer breaches a 
rule; ii) "trust-type rights plan" which involves the actual issuance of new stock reservation rights in advance to a trust bank.  Defense measures are also broken down by trigger 
level the acquirer has to reach for defense to be activated.  Panel B analyses Panel A the timing of the adoption of takeover defense measures by firms targeted by activist 
investors. 
 
Panel A - Adoption of “Poison Pills” by ALL Firms
≤ 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total
- By Type: . Type 1 = Prior-Warning . BOD meeting decision 18 71 26 1 116
. SH mtg approval 2 61 155 77 9 304
. SH mtg approval with changing charter 13 56 96 8 173
. Type 2 = Trust-Type Rights Plan . BOD meeting decision 0
. SH mtg approval 5 5 10
. SH mtg approval with changing charter 1 1
0 25 150 238 173 18 604
- By Trigger Level: . 15% 8 5 13
. 20% 24 139 227 171 17 578
. 25% 1 2 5 1 9
. 30% 1 1 2 4
0 25 150 238 173 18 604
Panel B - Adoption of “Poison Pills” by Firms TARGETED by Activist Investors
- in Calendar Time (keep only first time firm was targeted) ≤ 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total
Number of targeted firms (no repetitions) 259 146 161 132 55 6 759
Number of targeted firms that adopted "poison pills" 0 14 55 61 34 6 170
-in Event Time (T = Year Firm was first ) T-3 T-2 T-1 T T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 or more Total


























(T = first year after first activist 5% filing date)
"Poison Pill" Adoption
(Years Before/After Activist Targeting)
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Figure 1: Evolution of Ownership in Japan 
 
This figure describes the evolution of ownership of stocks listed in the Tokyo Stock Exchange in the period from 1986 
to 2008.  Investor categories (from bottom to top in the graph) are: Banks (City and Regional), Trust Banks, Pension 
and Mutual Funds, Life Insurance, Casualty Insurance, Other Financial Institutions, Securities Houses, Corporations, 








Evolution of Stock Ownership in Tokyo Stock Exchange
Banks
Trust Banks



























































 Figure 2: Timing and Duration of Activist Investments 
 









































 Figure 3: Buy-and-Hold Returns Around the Filing of a 5% or Greater Holding 
 
The line (in blue) presents the Average Buy-and-Hold return (BHAR) for each trading day around the disclosure filing. 
Time 0 in this graph corresponds to the filing date that an activist investor has a position exceeding 5% of outstanding 
shares in a firm.  The line plots the average buy-and-hold return in excess of the buy-and-hold return of the Nikkei 
Sogo (Comprehensive) Index.  The bars (in red) represent the average abnormal turnover in the event stocks.  This is 














-20 -17 -14 -11 -8 -5 -2 1 4 7 10 13 16 19
Abnormal Turnover (right scale)













Figure 4: Long-Run Returns – Calendar Time Portfolios 
 
Panel A presents the EW (Equal-Weighted) portfolio of event firms which is a portfolio formed by being long in equal 
amount on all open positions by all activist funds in targeted stocks in our sample.  Each day, we add a position when 
there is a filing disclosing in EDINET that a position exceeds 5% of outstanding shares in firm.  The position is 
terminated if it falls below 6%.  The portfolio is formed by equal weights in all event stocks.  To track EW portfolio 
performance, we take normalized index = 100 on July 1, 2007 (the first time there were simultaneously 10  activism 
engagements) and update it using CTPR EW index (t) = index(t-1) * (1 + avg(RET(t)) where avg(RET(t)) = equally-
weighted average of firms with at least one activist position >0.  Panel B presents the VW (Value-Weighted) portfolio 
of event firms which is a portfolio that is long on all targeted stocks with weights in proportion to yen position by 
activist funds in each firm.  The yen positions are calculated by multiplying (% held by activist) * (Market Cap of firm).  
We add a position when there is a filing disclosing in EDINET that a position exceeds 5% of outstanding shares in 
firm.  The position is rebalanced up or down any time the institution subsequently revises the disclosed level of 
ownership.  The position is terminated if it falls below 6%.  We track the VW portfolio performance by the yen 
position in each stock times the total return of that stock each day.  The plot also contains contemporaneous 
performance of Nikkei Sogo (Comprehensive) Index (in red), TOPIX (in orange), Russell Nomura Small Caps (dark 



























































































Figure 4: (Cont.) 
 
 






















































































Comparison of Main Features of U.S. vs. Japan Corporate Governance 
This table is based on Greenwood et al. (2009) and revised by the authors. 
 
Principle U.S. Japan 
Ownership 
Structure 
• Typical corporation is widely held.  Largest 
shareholders are often large institutional 
investors. 
• Ownership is historically more concentrated, with 
banks collectively owning large proportion. 
• Historically, cross-ownership was used as an anti-
takeover defense. 
• Cross-shareholding patterns fell during 1990s and 
2000s along with economic and banking crises. 
• Foreign institution significantly increased 
ownership in 1990s and 2000s. 
Bank 
Involvement 
• Limited/None.  Banks rarely hold equity  
positions in companies in their loan portfolio. 
• Banks were principal source of funding for many 
public companies before 1990. 




• NYSE and NASDAQ listing rules require the 
listed company have a majority of independent 
directors. 
• Exemptions are available if a listed company 
is a controlled company, provided that public 
disclosure is made.  This exemption does not 
apply to audit committees. 
• Only companies with a committee system 
(introduced in April 2003) must have independent 
directors (shagai torishimariyaku) who constitute a 
majority of each of the nomination, audit and 
compensation committees.  
• The other type of companies must have more than 
3 auditors, of which a majority should be 
independent.  Recently, companies of this type are 
also appointing independent directors. 
Fiduciary 
Duties 
• Duty of care: Duty to act on an informed 
Basis. 
• Duty of loyalty: Duty to act in good faith 
with honest faith that actions are in the best 
interests of the company's shareholders. 
• Business judgment rule: Rubuttable 
presumption that directors acted in accordance 
with their duties unless director's action is 
proved to lack rational purpose or constitute 
waste. 
• Zenkan chuui gimu: Directors must manage the 
company's affairs with due care and diligence of a 
good director. 
• Chuujitsu gimu: Directors must obey all laws and 
ordinances and the company's organizational 
documents and resolutions and must act in good 




• Squeezing out the minority is a related party 
transaction that can require a high level of 
legal scrutiny. 
• Controlling shareholder has to prove that the 
squeeze-out is entirely fair to all shareholders. 
• No duties of controlling shareholders. 





• All transactions subject to court scrutiny. 
• Controlling shareholder must prove fairness 
of self dealing transactions. 
• Related party transactions are subject to the 
approval by shareholders meeting or the board. 
• Related party transactions must be disclosed and 





• "poison pills" broadly describes takeover 
defenses that involve the target taking some 
action that harms both target and bidder. 
• Invented during the early 1980's as a 
response to tender-based hostile takeovers. 
• Upheld as a valid instrument of Delaware 
corporate law in 1985 decision. 
• Still used repeatedly in the U.S., although 
shareholders typically vote against new 
adoption of these plans. 
• Court decisions in 2006 and 2007 (most notably, a 
case involving Steel Partners and Bulldog Sauce) 
paved the way to many companies adopting "poison 
pill" defense measures. 
• By 2009, over 600 of listed companies have 
adopted "poison pill" plans.  
• Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and 
Ministry of Justice together prepared guideline for 




Appendix B: Comparison of the U.S. and Japanese Legal Environment for Shareholder Activism 
 
The information on the U.S. is taken from Becht et al. (2009). 




Under Delaware Corporate Law, Subchapter VII, (2) (b) annual meetings deal with the 
election of directors and are called as set out in the bylaws. 
Under Article 105 of the Companies Act, a shareholder possesses the right to cast a vote at 
shareholders meetings.  Election and dismissal of officers are voted in shareholders meetings. 
Special general 
meetings 
Special meetings can be called under Delaware Corporation Law, Subchapter VII, (2) (d), but 
shareholders cannot call these meetings, unless the certificate of incorporation or the bylaws 
state otherwise. Thus, company's bylaws can deprive the shareholder of the right to call 
special meetings. 
Article 296 (2) of the Companies Act:  Special meetings can be called whenever necessary.  
Article 297:  Shareholders having consecutively for the preceding 6 months or more not less 
than 3% of the votes of all shareholders may demand the directors, by showing the matters 
which shall be the purpose of the shareholders meeting (limited to the matters on which such 




Shareholders can ask the company to add proposals to the company proxy under SEC Rule 
14a-8, but this excludes all issues relating to elections; in general, proposals receiving a 
majority of votes under this rule are not binding on the board; the cost is borne by the 
company.  Shareholder proposals—also on board appointments—can be made under SEC 
Regulation 14A via a full proxy solicitation; the cost of the solicitation is borne by the 
shareholder. 
Article 303 (1) of the Companies Act:  At a Company with Board of Directors, only 
shareholders having consecutively for the preceding 6 months or more not less than 1% of the 
votes of all shareholders or not less than 300 votes of all shareholders may demand the 
directors that the directors include certain matters in the purpose of the shareholders meeting. 
In such cases, that demand shall be submitted no later than 8 weeks prior to the day of the 
shareholders meeting. 
Appointment/removal of directors 
Through board 
election 
The voting rules set out in state law apply; in practice, these are determined by the bylaws; 
under Delaware Law, by default plurality voting applies; this means that the votes in favor are 
counted for each candidate; the candidates who receive most votes (not necessarily a majority 
of the votes attending) win; in a hostile vote, if there are say six candidates for three board 
positions to be filled, the candidates with the three highest vote counts win. 
Article 341 of the Companies Act:  Resolutions for the election or dismissal of officers shall 
be made by the majority (in cases where a higher proportion is provided for in the articles of 
incorporation, such proportion or more) of the votes of the shareholders present at the meeting 
where the shareholders holding the majority of the votes (in cases where a proportion of one 
third or more is provided for in the articles of incorporation, such proportion or more) of the 
shareholders entitled to exercise their votes are present. 
By other means Under Delaware Corporation Law, Subchapter VII, (2) (b) shareholders can appoint directors 
(remove the board) by written consent, but this decision must be unanimous (a director 
holding one share could refuse to sign) and the bylaws can state otherwise. 
Shareholders having consecutively for the preceding 6 months or more not less than 3% of the 
votes may sue the firm and the officers. 
Tenure Under Delaware Law, it is possible to stagger the terms of directors, ensuring that only one-
third come up for election each year. 
Article 332 (1) of the Companies Act: Directors' terms of office shall continue until the 
conclusion of the annual shareholders meeting for the last business year which ends within 2 
years from the time of their election; provided, however, that this shall not preclude the 
shortening the term of the directors by the articles of incorporation or by the resolution of the 
shareholders meeting.  For the purpose of the application of the provisions under paragraph 
(1) to the directors of a Company with Committees, "2 years" in that paragraph shall be read 
as "1 year." 
Restrictions on 
voting concentration 
Under Delaware Law, it is possible to issue shareholder rights plans ("poison pills") that limit 
the ability of shareholders to concentrate voting power beyond certain thresholds, typically 
10–15%; there is no mandatory bid requirement. 
Poison pills can be implemented by rights offerings.  Article 127-2-2 of the Ordinance for 
Enforcement of the Companies Act requires issuers to disclose such intension in their 
Business Report ("pre-warning" type of takeover defense measure). 
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Appendix C 
Comparison of Disclosure Rules regarding Large Block Holding:  U.S. and Japan 
 
The information on the U.S. is based on Block and Hoff (1998) and Securities and Exchange Commission (1998). 
 U.S. Japan 
Schedule 13D Schedule 13G Standard Reporting Special Provision 
Until December 31, 2006 From January 1, 2007 Until December 31, 2006 From January 1, 2007 
Related Law Section 13(d) of the Securities 
and Exchange Act of 1934 
Section 13(g) of the 
Securities and Exchange 
Act of 1934 
Article 27 of the Securities and 
Exchange Act 
Article 27 of the Financial 
Instruments and Exchange Act 
of 2007 
Article 27 of the Securities 
and Exchange Act 
Article 27 of the Financial 




Any person acquiring 
beneficial ownership of more 
than 5% of a class of voting 
securities. 
Qualified  Institutional 
Investors: Institutional 
investor that qualifies to submit 
Schedule 13D, but no purpose 
of changing or influencing the 
control of the issuer. 
Passive Investors: Any person 
acquiring more than 5% but 
less than 20% of an equity 
security and has not acquired 
the securities with any purpose 
of changing or influencing the 
control of the issuer 
A holder of the Target Securities whose holding exceeds 5% (a 
"Large Volume Holder").  The holders shall include the following 
persons, in addition to a person who owns Share Certificates in the 
name of him/herself or another person (or under a fictitious name): 
(i) A person who has the authority to exercise his/her voting rights 
or any other rights as a shareholder of the issuer of the Share 
Certificates or to give instructions as to the exercise of said voting 
rights or any other rights, based on a money trust contract or any 
other contract or the provisions of laws, and who aims at 
controlling business activities of said issuer; or  
(ii) A person who has the authority necessary to make investments 
in Share Certificates based on a discretionary investment contract 




Within 10 days after the 
acquisition. 
Qualified Institutional 
Investors: Within 45 days after 
calendar year in which the 
person holds more than 5% as 
of the year end, or within 10 
days after the end of the first 
month in which the person's 
beneficial ownership exceeds 
10% of the class of equity 
securities computed as of 
the end of the month. 
Passive Investors: Within 10 
days after the acquisition. 
Within 5 days from the date on 
which such person has come to 
be a Large Volume Holder 
(Sundays and other 
holidays specified by a Cabinet 
Order shall not be included for 
the purpose of counting days). 
 
(Same as before) 
In addition, when a Large 
Volume Holder intends to 
conduct an Act of Making 
Important Suggestion, etc. 
within a period specified by a 
Cabinet Order from the date 
when the Holding Ratio of 
Share Certificates have 
exceeded 5%, such person shall 
submit to the Prime Minister a 
Report of Possession of Large 
Volume by 5 days prior. 
15th day of the subsequent 
month. if for any purpose 
other than that of controlling 
the business activities of the 
company that issues the Share 
Certificates have exceeded 
5% for the first time 
Within 5 days from the 
Reference Date if the purpose 
of holding is not for effecting 
material changes in or giving 
material effect to the business 
activities of the issuer of said 
Share Certificates have 




File promptly to reflect any 
material change including a 
change in investment purpose.  
An acquisition or  disposition 
of beneficial ownership of 
securities equal to 1% or more 
of the class is deemed to be a 
material change. 
Qualified Institutional 
Investors: Within 45 days after 
the end of the calendar year to 
report any change in the 
information, within 10 days 
after the end of the first month 
in which the person's beneficial 
ownership exceeds 10% of the 
class computed as of the end of 
the month, and thereafter 
If the Holding Ratio of Share Certificates has increased or 
decreased by 1% or more, or where there arises any other changes 
in important matters to be contained in the Report of Possession of 
Large Volume, the Large Volume Holder shall submit to the 
Prime Minister a report on the changed matters within 5 days from 
the change provided, however, that this shall not apply to a 
Change Report that reports a decrease of 1% or more in the 
Holding Ratio of Share Certificates in which case a Change 
Report reporting that the Holding Ratio of Share Certificates are 
5% or less has already been submitted. 
When the Holding Ratio of 
Share Certificates on a 
Reference Date (final day of 
every 3-month period) that 
comes after the Reference 
Date pertaining to the Report 
of Possession of Large 
Volume increased or 
decreased by 1% or more 
from the Holding Ratio of 
When the Holding Ratio of 
Share Certificates on a 
Reference Date (two or more 
days in each month) that comes 
after the Reference Date 
pertaining to the Report of 
Possession of Large Volume 
increased or decreased by 1% 
or more from the Holding 
Ratio of Share Certificates that 
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within 10 days of the end of 
any month in which the 
person's beneficial ownership 
increases or decreases more 
than 5% computed as of the 
end of the month. 
Passive Investors: Within 45 
days after the end of the 
calendar year. In addition, an 
amendment must be filed 
promptly if  ownership exceeds 
10% of the class and thereafter 
if ownership increasing or 
decreasing more than 5%. 
Share Certificates that were 
stated in the Report of 
Possession of Large Volume, 
or where there arises any 
other case specified by a 
Cabinet Order as a change in 
important matters to be stated 
in said Report of  Possession 
of Large Volume: 15th day of 
the month subsequent to the 
month of the Reference Date. 
 
 
were stated in the Report of 
Possession of Large Volume, 
or where there arises any other 
case specified by a Cabinet 
Order as a change in important 
matters to be stated in said 
Report of  Possession of Large 
Volume: within 5 days from 
the later Reference Date. 
 







from passive to 
active.) 
Qualified Institutional 
Investors: Within 10 days after 
the person determines that it no 
longer holds the securities (i) in 
the ordinary course of business 
or (ii) without the purpose or 
effect of changing control of 
the issuer or ceases to be an 
eligible institution. 
Passive Investors: Within 10 
days of: (i) acquiring or 
holding the securities with the 
purpose or effect of changing 
or influencing control of the 
issuer or in a transaction 
having that effect, or (ii) the 
person's beneficial ownership 
equals or exceeds 20% of the 
class of equity securities. 
The filing person may re-file 
on Schedule 13G 
once the disqualification 
has ended. 
(Not specified.) When the Holding Ratio of 
Share Certificates has 
increased by 1% or more after 
the submission of the Report of 
Possession of Large Volume, 
or the Change Report and when 
the shareholder intends to 
conduct an Act of Making 
Important Suggestions, etc. 
from the date of said increase, 
the shareholder shall submit to 
the Prime Minister a Change 
Report by 5 days prior to the 
date of such Act of Making 
Important Suggestions, etc. 
  
Submission To the Securities and Exchange Commission. To the Prime Minister 
(Ministry of Finance - 
Financial Services Agency), 
copy to the stock exchange 
where the target firm is listed. 
To the Prime Minister 
(Financial Services Agency), 
copy to the stock exchange 




Available on EDGAR (Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and 
Retrieval) system  
The Prime Minister and the stock exchange shall, pursuant to the provisions of a Cabinet Office Ordinance, make Reports of 
Possession of Large Volume and Change Reports as well as Change Reports thereof available for public inspection for five years from 




EDGAR system (mandatory). Voluntary.  Mandated from April 1, 2007 
on EDINET. 








































Position: First >5% Filing Day 4-Jul-01 15-Jan-02 15-Jul-03 13-Oct-05 13-Oct-05 13-Jan-06 29-Nov-02 20-Nov-03 27-Jan-06 9-Jul-04 7-Oct-05 22-Mar-07
First position 5.77% 9.24% 7.37% 5.15% 5.11% 5.16% 5.10% 10.31% 6.05% 5.11% 7.40% 5.10%
Last Filing Day (< 6%) 13-Jan-06 15-Oct-04 18-Feb-05 13-Oct-06 13-Oct-06 6-Nov-07 7-Jan-09 21-Dec-06 7-Jan-09 13-Jul-06 12-Mar-09 15-Aug-08
No. of Days Invested 1654 1004 584 365 365 662 2231 1127 1076 734 1252 512
Day: max position 4-Sep-03 5-Feb-03 13-Jan-05 14-Jul-06 13-Oct-05 15-Jan-07 11-Jan-07 21-Dec-04 10-Aug-07 9-Jul-04 7-Oct-05 21-Nov-07
Maximum position 13.6% 11.3% 18.6% 6.3% 5.1% 7.3% 13.69% 23.11% 11.27% 5.1% 7.4% 7.1%
Initial Capital Committed (Y mln) 8,547 4,144 8,243 8,934 5,661 5,986 473 1,113 19,931 2,713 8,796 9,001
Max Capital Committed  (Y mln) 13,469 5,019 33,500 10,955 5,661 10,220 4,848 7,087 42,883 2,713 8,796 9,479
Returns: Total IRR for investment 0.27% 35.93% 57.10% -0.86% -21.38% -3.12% 2.08% 15.82% -25.56% 3.10% -23.44% -15.77%
BHAR (-5:+5) -4.43% 4.77% 2.87% -4.32% 18.01% -8.05% 2.50% 0.30% 3.60% 2.63% -1.14% 11.36%
Firm Accounting Month Feb-01 Mar-01 Mar-03 Mar-05 Mar-05 Mar-05 Mar-02 Sep-03 Mar-05 Mar-04 Mar-05 Mar-06
 Performance ROA 0.027 0.006 0.016 0.126 0.032 -0.005 0.029 0.015 0.059 0.043 0.025 0.050
(Before) MB ratio 0.690 1.018 0.550 3.512 2.245 5.936 0.468 0.448 1.907 1.148 1.312 2.189
Leverage 0.102 0.302 0.220 0.249 0.473 0.851 0.250 0.433 0.553 0.254 0.578 0.424
Payout 0.271 0.458 0.095 0.192 0.352 -1.519 0.288 0.469 0.136 0.271 0.301 0.136
Dividend Yield 0.012 0.004 0.004 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.024 0.030 0.010 0.014 0.014 0.005
Cash to Asset 0.724 0.238 0.075 0.407 0.081 0.441 0.226 0.155 0.241 0.197 0.065 0.080
Firm Accounting Month Feb-06 Mar-05 Mar-05 Mar-07 Mar-07 Mar-08 Mar-09 Bought Mar-09 Mar-07 Mar-09 Mar-09
 Performance ROA 0.020 0.009 0.025 0.112 0.065 0.107 0.012 by 0.045 0.056 0.035 0.020
(After) MB ratio 0.812 1.319 1.309 2.921 3.790 1.845 0.826 Nissin 0.991 1.567 0.522 0.082
Leverage 0.164 0.468 0.377 0.241 0.375 0.587 0.355 Foods 0.410 0.251 0.527 0.341
Payout 0.451 0.592 0.082 0.206 0.226 0.286 0.953 0.473 0.303 0.247 0.452
Dividend Yield 0.013 0.007 0.003 0.010 0.006 0.040 0.021 0.036 0.015 0.036 0.016





(domestic, hostile) (domestic, non-hostile)
Sparx Steel Partners
(foreign, hostile)
